Earlier speculation thread here: http://www.neogaf.com/forum/showthread.php?t=1448462
Updated Ars story: https://arstechnica.com/information...ck-attack-destroys-nearly-all-wi-fi-security/
PATCHING YOUR ROUTER IS NOT ENOUGH. YOUR PHONES, LAPTOPS, ETC., NEED TO BE PATCHED.
Patch dates by vendor
EDIT: Microsoft says Windows is patched as of last week. Google says Nexus/Pixel devices to be patched November 6. Apple says current betas (iOS 11.1 dev beta 3, etc.) incorporate the patch.
KRACK: Key Reinstallation AttaCKs
In short, effectively all client WiFi devices (laptops, phones, tablets, consoles, smart home/IoT devices, etc.) using WPA2 security (the "secure" standard) are entirely insecure due to vulnerable handshake handling. All of your WiFi traffic can be snooped and manipulated with ease. Clients need to be updated to resolve this vulnerability. VPNs and HTTPS might help, but if an attacker controls your WiFi connection, targeted man-in-the-middle attacks may also render those worthless.
Downgrading to WEP, WPA1, etc., is not advised, as those protocols are broken. If you want even the veneer of secure connections, used a wired connection until your devices are updated.
Note that this isn't a device-specific bug, but rather a failing of the WPA2 protocol. That said, some devices are easier to exploit than others, with modern Android/Linux devices being particularly at risk.
Details are up at https://www.krackattacks.com/
Updated Ars story: https://arstechnica.com/information...ck-attack-destroys-nearly-all-wi-fi-security/
PATCHING YOUR ROUTER IS NOT ENOUGH. YOUR PHONES, LAPTOPS, ETC., NEED TO BE PATCHED.
Patch dates by vendor
EDIT: Microsoft says Windows is patched as of last week. Google says Nexus/Pixel devices to be patched November 6. Apple says current betas (iOS 11.1 dev beta 3, etc.) incorporate the patch.
KRACK: Key Reinstallation AttaCKs
In short, effectively all client WiFi devices (laptops, phones, tablets, consoles, smart home/IoT devices, etc.) using WPA2 security (the "secure" standard) are entirely insecure due to vulnerable handshake handling. All of your WiFi traffic can be snooped and manipulated with ease. Clients need to be updated to resolve this vulnerability. VPNs and HTTPS might help, but if an attacker controls your WiFi connection, targeted man-in-the-middle attacks may also render those worthless.
Downgrading to WEP, WPA1, etc., is not advised, as those protocols are broken. If you want even the veneer of secure connections, used a wired connection until your devices are updated.
Note that this isn't a device-specific bug, but rather a failing of the WPA2 protocol. That said, some devices are easier to exploit than others, with modern Android/Linux devices being particularly at risk.
Details are up at https://www.krackattacks.com/
Key reinstallation attacks: concrete example against the 4-way handshake
As described in the introduction of the research paper, the idea behind a key reinstallation attack can be summarized as follows. When a client joins a network, it executes the 4-way handshake to negotiate a fresh encryption key. It will install this key after receiving message 3 of the 4-way handshake. Once the key is installed, it will be used to encrypt normal data frames using an encryption protocol. However, because messages may be lost or dropped, the Access Point (AP) will retransmit message 3 if it did not receive an appropriate response as acknowledgment. As a result, the client may receive message 3 multiple times. Each time it receives this message, it will reinstall the same encryption key, and thereby reset the incremental transmit packet number (nonce) and receive replay counter used by the encryption protocol. We show that an attacker can force these nonce resets by collecting and replaying retransmissions of message 3 of the 4-way handshake. By forcing nonce reuse in this manner, the encryption protocol can be attacked, e.g., packets can be replayed, decrypted, and/or forged. The same technique can also be used to attack the group key, PeerKey, TDLS, and fast BSS transition handshake.
Practical impact
In our opinion, the most widespread and practically impactful attack is the key reinstallation attack against the 4-way handshake. We base this judgement on two observations. First, during our own research we found that most clients were affected by it. Second, adversaries can use this attack to decrypt packets sent by clients, allowing them to intercept sensitive information such as passwords or cookies. Decryption of packets is possible because a key reinstallation attack causes the transmit nonces (sometimes also called packet numbers or initialization vectors) to be reset to zero. As a result, the same encryption key is used with nonce values that have already been used in the past. In turn, this causes all encryption protocols of WPA2 to reuse keystream when encrypting packets. In case a message that reuses keystream has known content, it becomes trivial to derive the used keystream. This keystream can then be used to decrypt messages with the same nonce. When there is no known content, it is harder to decrypt packets, although still possible in several cases (e.g. English text can still be decrypted). In practice, finding packets with known content is not a problem, so it should be assumed that any packet can be decrypted.
The ability to decrypt packets can be used to decrypt TCP SYN packets. This allows an adversary to obtain the TCP sequence numbers of a connection, and hijack TCP connections. As a result, even though WPA2 is used, the adversary can now perform one of the most common attacks against open Wi-Fi networks: injecting malicious data into unencrypted HTTP connections. For example, an attacker can abuse this to inject ransomware or malware into websites that the victim is visiting.
If the victim uses either the WPA-TKIP or GCMP encryption protocol, instead of AES-CCMP, the impact is especially catastrophic. Against these encryption protocols, nonce reuse enables an adversary to not only decrypt, but also to forge and inject packets. Moreover, because GCMP uses the same authentication key in both communication directions, and this key can be recovered if nonces are reused, it is especially affected. Note that support for GCMP is currently being rolled out under the name Wireless Gigabit (WiGig), and is expected to be adopted at a high rate over the next few years.
The direction in which packets can be decrypted (and possibly forged) depends on the handshake being attacked. Simplified, when attacking the 4-way handshake, we can decrypt (and forge) packets sent by the client. When attacking the Fast BSS Transition (FT) handshake, we can decrypt (and forge) packets sent towards the client. Finally, most of our attacks also allow the replay of unicast, broadcast, and multicast frames. For further details, see Section 6 of our research paper.
Note that our attacks do not recover the password of the Wi-Fi network. They also do not recover (any parts of) the fresh encryption key that is negotiated during the 4-way handshake.
Android and Linux
Our attack is especially catastrophic against version 2.4 and above of wpa_supplicant, a Wi-Fi client commonly used on Linux. Here, the client will install an all-zero encryption key instead of reinstalling the real key. This vulnerability appears to be caused by a remark in the Wi-Fi standard that suggests to clear the encryption key from memory once it has been installed for the first time. When the client now receives a retransmitted message 3 of the 4-way handshake, it will reinstall the now-cleared encryption key, effectively installing an all-zero key. Because Android uses wpa_supplicant, Android 6.0 and above also contains this vulnerability. This makes it trivial to intercept and manipulate traffic sent by these Linux and Android devices. Note that currently 41% of Android devices are vulnerable to this exceptionally devastating variant of our attack.
Is my device vulnerable?
Probably. Any device that uses Wi-Fi is likely vulnerable. Contact your vendor for more information.
What if there are no security updates for my router?
Our main attack is against the 4-way handshake, and does not exploit access points, but instead targets clients. So it might be that your router does not require security updates. We strongly advise you to contact your vendor for more details. In general though, you can try to mitigate attacks against routers and access points by disabling client functionality (which is for example used in repeater modes) and disabling 802.11r (fast roaming). For ordinary home users, your priority should be updating clients such as laptops and smartphones.
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Will the Wi-Fi standard be updated to address this?
There seems to be an agreement that the Wi-Fi standard should be updated to explicitly prevent our attacks. These updates likely will be backwards-compatible with older implementations of WPA2. Time will tell whether and how the standard will be updated.