The West Australian has a scoop today on one possible policy that could emerge from the new Governments Commission of Audit:
The university education debt of millions of Australians could be sold off under a proposal to be examined by Prime Minister Tony Abbotts inquiry into the state of the nations finances.
In a move that could boost the Budget bottom line, up to $23 billion of outstanding Higher Education Contribution Scheme debt would be effectively privatised under a plan that has already won support in some financial circles.
One proposal that has backing in the financial sector is to convert the $22.6 billion in HECS debt held by 1.6 million Australians into a financial product. In a process called securitisation, the responsibility for HECS debts would be bought by the private sector and then sold to investors.
This has been recommended before, as the article notes. The Commission of Audit established by the Howard Government in 1996 said consideration should be given to securitising HECS.
The proposal is kind of bananas.
Think about it from the perspective of a potential investor who might consider buying a security that entitled them to a stream of future HECS repayments from former students. As theyre currently structured, HECS debts have a 0% real interest rate (theyre just indexed by the CPI), there is no fixed timetable for repayments, and unpaid debts cant be recouped from a debtors estate when he or she passes away.
It wouldnt make sense to buy such an asset at its full value, when there are other safe assets with guaranteed repayment that pay real interest. To induce people to buy his HECS securities, then, Mr Hockey would have to either:
Sell them at way below their face value; or
Change the terms of the debt by charging real interest and/or allowing the debt to be recovered from the estates of deceased debtors.
In option 1, Mr Hockey would be exchanging an asset from the Governments balance sheet (outstanding HECS debts are an asset from the Governments perspective) for a sum of money upfront that would be worth way less than that asset. This is the opposite of responsible financial management.
Imagine you owned a house outright and were looking to sell it. Youre confident the house is worth $1 million, but finding a buyer willing to pay the appropriate price might take a couple of months. If someone approached you offering $500 000 in cash for the house if youll sell it today, youd have to be nuts (or have a seriously high discount rate) to take the offer. Accepting way less than face value for the HECS assets would be much the same type of craziness selling an asset for less than its worth just to get the money now rather than later. This is the fiscal equivalent of hocking your possessions at Cash Converters.
Its not clear to me that selling the HECS assets would even help the fiscal balance. Its my impression that the Budget treats the loans to students as an asset. The discount for early repayment is an expense, as is the estimated portion of the HECS debt that is unlikely to be repaid. The indexation of the debt is treated as revenue. Unless I have misunderstood, selling the HECS assets for cash shouldnt affect the budget balance at all it will just reduce the net financial assets held on the Governments balance sheet. If Im right, the sale would affect the cash balance but not the fiscal balance, which uses accrual accounting. The Budget moved to accrual accounting during Peter Costellos time as Treasurer, for good reason.
In option 2, the Government could make HECS more attractive to potential investors by changing the terms of HECS debts. It could lower the repayment thresholds, collect HECS from Australians working overseas, and/or recoup HECS liabilities from the estates of deceased debtors. These options would all reduce the proportion of HECS debt that is never repaid. It could also start charging real interest on HECS debts. Each of these measures would increase the flow of income from HECS debtors to the owner of the asset.
There are a few problems with this. First, any change like this that would make the ownership of HECS debt more attractive to private investors would also make it more attractive to retain on the governments books. Raising the real interest rate would increase HECS revenue. Increasing the proportion of HECS debt that is recouped (through whatever means) would lower the expenses associated with HECS. These changes would benefit the government, as the HECS lender, if it retains the asset on its books. That means that investors would need to pay more to buy the asset from government, or else the government is getting a bad deal. So changing the terms of HECS debts doesnt raise the attractiveness of HECS assets for private investors relative to government it lifts the value of the asset by an equal amount regardless of the owner.
The second big problem with changing the terms of the HECS debt is that it could discourage people from going to uni, particularly prospective students from relatively poor backgrounds. At the moment, HECS is a pretty good deal. Your debt doesnt rise in real terms, you dont start paying it back until you earn somewhere around the median full-time wage, and the repayment levels are not too onerous. If you change that deal, you risk putting people off from going to uni. This risk was clearly identified in the review of base funding for tertiary education, although the evidence about whether past cuts to repayment thresholds affected participation is inconclusive.
It is difficult to imagine conditions under which this policy makes sense.