Possible evidence of China practicing preemptive attacks against U.S. bases ranges from 2012 to October 2016. There is no new 2017 information here but this becomes relevant given the current tensions.
It seems to me that a lot of people don't take China as seriously as they should.
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War on the Rocks: Has China Been Practicing Preemptive Missile Strikes Against U.S. Bases?
It seems to me that a lot of people don't take China as seriously as they should.
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War on the Rocks: Has China Been Practicing Preemptive Missile Strikes Against U.S. Bases?
In reality, the greatest military threat to U.S. vital interests in Asia may be one that has received somewhat less attention: the growing capability of Chinas missile forces to strike U.S. bases.
This is a time of increasing tension, with Chinas news organizations openly threatening war.U.S. leaders and policymakers should understand that a preemptive Chinese missile strike against the forward bases that underpin U.S. military power in the Western Pacific is a very real possibility, particularly if China believes its claimed core strategic interests are threatened in the course of a crisis and perceives that its attempts at deterrence have failed.
Such a preemptive strike appears consistent with available information about Chinas missile force doctrine, and the satellite imagery shown below points to what may be real-world efforts to practice its execution.The Peoples Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLA) Rocket Force originally focused on nuclear deterrence. Since the Cold War, the force has increasingly focused on the employment of precision-guided conventional ballistic and land attack cruise missiles. The command now consists of about 100,000 personnel and was elevated in December 2015 to a status co-equal to that of Chinas other military services.In all, Chinese military writings on conventional missile campaigns stress the importance of surprise and suggest a preference for preemptive strikes. And while most Sinologists discount the idea of a true bolt-from-the-blue attack in a crisis without first giving an adversary a chance to back down, preemptive missile strikes to initiate active hostilities could be consistent with Chinas claimed overall military strategy of active defense.
As a 2007 RAND study of Chinas anti-access strategies explained, This paradox is explained by defining the enemys first strike as any military activities conducted by the enemy aimed at breaking up China territorially and violating its sovereignty and thereby rendered the equivalent of a strategic first shot. China analyst Dean Cheng stated similarly in 2015, From Mao to now, the concept of the active defense has emphasized assuming the strategic defensive, while securing the operational and tactical initiative, including preemptive actions at those levels if necessary.
Thus, China could consider a preemptive missile strike as a defensive counter-attack to a threat against Chinas sovereignty (e.g., over Taiwan or the South China Sea) solely in the political or strategic realm.If such a strike still seems unlikely, consider that U.S. military and civilian leaders may have a blind spot regarding the capabilities of the PLA Rocket Force. The bulk of the PLA Rocket Force the conventionally armed precision-strike units have no real counterpart in the U.S. military. American long-range ballistic missiles are all nuclear-tipped and therefore focused on nuclear deterrence, and the Armys short-range tactical ballistic missiles are designed for battlefield use. Also, per the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty with Russia, the United States fields no medium- or intermediate-range ballistic missiles of any kind, nor any ground-launched land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs).But for now, a layered ballistic missile defense is necessary, as the short-range Patriot air and missile defense batteries currently guarding U.S. and allied bases in Japan seem unlikely to succeed against a mass Chinese raid.
Author: Thomas Shugart is a Senior Military Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and a submarine warfare officer in the U.S. Navy. The opinions expressed here are the authors and do not represent the official position of the U.S. Navy, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
Possible PLA Rocket Force ballistic missile impact range in Western China.
Left side Possible vehicle targets with sub-munition impact pattern, imagery dated Dec. 2013. Right side U.S. Patriot air and missile defense battery, Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, Japan. Scale of sub-munition pattern overlaid for comparison.
Possible parked aircraft target, imagery dated August 2013. Upper left aircraft shaped target, imagery dated May 2012. Lower right F-22 Fighter Parking Area, Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, Japan.
Possible test targets simulating above-ground fuel tanks, imagery dated September 2012. Compared to actual fuel tanks in Japan, similar scale.
Possible runway cratering munition testing, imagery dated Sept. 2012.
Possible mock electronic substation target, imagery dated July 2013. Note no electrical lines running to or from the target in its very remote location. While no craters are visible, disablement may be planned using other methods, such as dispersal of conductive graphite filaments.
Possible hardened aircraft shelter or bunker test targets, imagery dated Oct. 2016. Penetrator sub-munition impacts visible. Lower right: Misawa Air Base, Japan, similar scale.
Possible moored ship and naval facility targets, imagery dated August 2013. Compared for scale with actual U.S. destroyer.
Possible naval ship and harbor targets, compared to inner harbor at U.S. naval base at Yokosuka, Japan.