Headline article of this months' Economist.
Impossible to sum up the entirety of the article; I encourage you read it. Another worrisome election for the future of world affairs.
https://www.economist.com/news/brie...aped-countrys-politics-and-sidelined-its-main
Impossible to sum up the entirety of the article; I encourage you read it. Another worrisome election for the future of world affairs.
https://www.economist.com/news/brie...aped-countrys-politics-and-sidelined-its-main
This bonfire of the elites has left France with a slate of candidates all but one of whom were not considered serious contenders for any partys nomination six months ago. One of them, Emmanuel Macron, a former Socialist economy minister, is a candidate without the backing of an established party but with a real chance of victory, another unprecedented development. Benoît Hamon, the Socialist Partys candidate, is a former backbench rebel against his own party. The centre-right nominee, François Fillon, will be put under formal investigation on March 15th accused of abusing his office to pay unearned salaries to his family; nevertheless, he says he will fight on.
And then there is Ms Le Pen. The populist leader, who has run the FN since 2011, leads The Economists poll of polls (see chart 1). There is a good chance that she will come top in the first round of the electionagain, something for which there is no precedent. (When her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, the FNs founder and former leader, got into the second round in 2002 it was as the first-round runner-up, with just 17% of the vote). For the other candidates the election has become a race to stand against her in the second round on May 7th, and the campaign a test of the ability of mainstream politicians to shape a response to renascent nationalism.
Perhaps the most distinctive aspect of the FN vote, though, is the faultline it reveals between the countrys cosmopolitan cities, at ease with globalisation, and those in-between places where farmland gives way to retail sprawl and a sense of neglect. Between 2006 and 2011, the number of jobs in 13 big French citiesLyon, Marseille, Toulouse, Lille, Bordeaux, Nantes, Nice, Strasbourg, Rennes, Grenoble, Rouen, Montpellier and Toulonincreased on average by 5%. In France as a whole, jobs were lost. These dynamic cities, with their elegant pedestrian centres, tech hubs and gourmet food, vote for the left (Lyon, Nantes, Rennes), the greens (Grenoble) or the centre-right (Bordeaux). They are not immune to Frances feeling of being fed up; in April and May, many of them may opt for Mr Macron. But none registers a strong vote for the FN.
Around them, though, is what Christophe Guilluy, a geographer, calls peripheral France. This is the world of lost employers like the Lejaby lingerie factory in Bellegarde-sur-Valserine, in the foothills of the Alps, or the Moulinex factory in Alençon, in southern Normandy. It is a world where Uber, bike-share schemes and co-working spaces are nowhere to be found, and where people sense that globalisation has passed them by. It is a world where the FN is on the rise.
One is a sense that a great country, the cradle of human rights and the Enlightenment, has somehow lost its way. This is particularly obvious in economic terms. Since the end of the trente glorieuses, the three decades of strong growth that followed the second world war, it has been debt, rather than growth, that has financed the high-speed trains, the blooming municipal flower beds and the generous provisions for child care, ill health, job loss and old age that are the hallmark of Frances splendid public sector. French public spending now accounts for a greater share of GDP than it does in Sweden. But no French government has balanced its budget since 1974.
Over the past 15 years, there has been a particular décrochage, or decoupling, between the French economy and that of Germany, its closest ally. In 2002 the two countries enjoyed comparable GDP per head. Germany, under Gerhard Schröder, began to reform itself. France, under Jacques Chirac, didnt. Today, Germans have 17% more purchasing power per person. Labour costs in France have risen faster than in Germany, deterring the creation of permanent jobs and undermining competitiveness. The countrys share of all goods exports between EU countries has dropped from 13.4% to 10.5%.
Legitimate worries about terrorism have supplied fertile ground for insidious identity politics. As the home to one of Europes biggest Muslim minorities, France is more alert than, say, Italy or Spain to hints of religious extremism. Moreover, the country has a pre-existing and unforgiving framework for managing religious expressionknown as laïcitéwhich recent governments, fearing a threat to secularism, have tightened up. When this provokes a rowover Muslim head-coverings, sayit plays straight into Ms Le Pens hands; she has little trouble persuading voters that their values are under threat. France, she tells her flag-waving rallies, faces nothing less than submersion.
Ms Le Pen succeeds not because of the way her policies, which include a lower retirement age, more taxes on foreign workers and massive increases in spending on the armed forces, would tackle economic insecurity or the threat of terror (they wouldnt). It is because of her talent for blending two strands of populism: anti-immigrant talk about values and churches, strong in the south, and anti-market discourse about jobs and the system, favoured in the north. On both counts, she can tap into French history.