Azih said:
It's my worldview , I've kinda got the edge as an authority on it.
But you have no authority over what constitutes a good analogy.
Believing that Allah exists (on good evidence or on faith, it doesn't matter) is analogous to
believing that apples are the most nutritious fruits, but it is not analogous to
choosing to eat a Snickers bar.
I just noted that 'If something that I know contradicts something I believe then I change what I believe', my beliefs *are* constrained by evidence.
If the something new I learn *contradicts* what I believe then it does force me to change my beliefs.
That's what you tell yourself to pretend that you're a rational person, but in practice your current beliefs are not constrained at all, because you're a religious moderate, and religious moderates always prefer to hold beliefs that can't be contradicted by evidence.
What would you think of someone who believes that there is an invisible and undetectable dragon in his garage, but claims that he'll change his mind if contradictory evidence comes to light? Since no such evidence can ever be discovered, this person's claim to rationality is just so much wind. His beliefs are a bit constrained by the evidence, since he can't believe in a visible, detectable dragon in his garage, but for the most part he can believe whatever suits him. He can believe in an undetectable angel, in an undetectable Flying Spaghetti Monster, in a undetectable God, almost anything he likes.
And that I will dispute with you, I am not using belief as a synonym for knowledge. If there is a confusion in terminology than let us replace wherever I used the word 'believe' with the phrase 'have faith in' to make it less ambiguous. (faith:Belief that does not rest on logical proof or material evidence)
Then I was right, you use(d) the word "belief" for unsupported beliefs, and the word "knowledge" for supported beliefs.
My point is that there is no difference between the mental state of someone who believes (has faith in) something, and the mental state of someone who knows (has good evidence for) something. A person who truly believes (on faith) that there is a dragon in my garage and a person who knows (because of evidence) that there is a dragon in my garage will think and act in exactly the same way: If they're not suicidal, they'll refuse to go in my garage.
The only difference between having faith in something and knowing something is, obviously, the origin of these beliefs, the way that the person came to hold these beliefs: The former because of wishful thinking, childhood indoctrination, etc, and the latter because of good evidence and/or good logic.
However, once the person has begun believing something, for all practical intents and purposes it doesn't matter how he came to believe it. All that matters is that he believes it; from that point on, he will act as if he knows his belief is true, regardless of whether he really knows it or not.
I do not have faith that sticking my hand in a fire will hurt me because I know that it will hurt me. I do not have faith that if I go to sleep early I will be better rested tomorrow I know that is true.
On the other hand I do not know that if I gave my credit card number to online merchants I won't have my credit abused but I have faith that it won't.
Now if I start finding unauthorized transactions on a credit card that I only use for online purchases and has not been stolen then that faith will be very much changed based on new knowledge. Having faith in something and knowing something are two different things.
What if you stick your hand in a fire and it
doesn't hurt you? You admit that possibility, don't you? After all, we don't know everything about how the universe works (and even if we did we wouldn't know that we know). Hell, it's even possible that there is a God and that he'll one day intervene to protect your hand from the fire.
In everyday life, what "knowing something" means is "being very, very certain about something". It doesn't mean being 100% certain, because as I've just shown it's not possible to be 100% certain about anything (except your own existence and logical and mathematical truths).
Knowledge/belief isn't binary, it's a continuum. While in everyday life we might say things that imply that "Either you believe something or you don't!", in reality we assign probabilities to every one of our beliefs, to every parcel of what (we think) we know. To say that you know your hand will get burned if you put it in a fire means that you believe there's a very high likelihood that it won't get burned (something like 99.99999999999%).
Likewise, I would say that I have a strong suspicion that my card won't be abused by an online merchant, which would translate to a probability like 65%. There's no faith involved here, unless I delude myself into believing that the likelihood is actually 99.99999999%.
Lack of belief in something is not the same thing as believing it isn't true.
That's true. However...
To be extremely dismissive of a claim EQUALS not believing it is true. Not believing it's true IS NOT THE SAME AS believing that it's false. Negation of belief is not belief of negation.
Proposition A 'I do not believe that there is a dragon in the garage'
is not the same as
Proposition B 'I believe there is no dragon in the garage'
Not believing that a claim is true and not believing that it's false means exactly that. It means that we aren't dismissive of it and we aren't dismissive of its negation.
a) If I throw a six-sided die in the air, I don't know if it will give an even number or an odd number. I do not believe that it will be even, and I do not believe that it will be odd. I am not dismissive of either claim.
b) If I throw a huge die with ten thousand sides (and I have good reason to think the die isn't tricked), I do know/believe that it won't give the number 7586. I am dismissive of the claim that it will give the number 7586.
The only remaining question is this: Is the claim that there is an undetectable dragon in my garage like (a) the claim that the six-sided die will give an odd number, or is it like (b) the claim that a 10 000-sided die will give 7586?
I'm not going to explain Bayesian inference to you; I'm simply going to ask you to look within your own mind and tell me what your belief/knowledge about the undetectable dragon in my garage really is. If your mental state with regard to a dragon in my garage was like (a), if you believed there's an approximately 50% chance that you'll be eaten alive (let's say the dragon can temporarily materialize itself at will), would you be willing to go into my garage? No, you wouldn't.
That you would be willing to go into my garage shows that you treat this claim like claim (b), not like claim (a). It shows that you are extremely dismissive of the claim that there is a dragon in my garage. To put it in other words, it shows that you believe that there is no dragon in my garage. And since you are logically justified in this belief, it is also knowledge.
Carl Sagan obviously *did not believe* in a theist god, and yet he required compelling evidence to *believe there is no* theist god.
Then Carl was either mistaken, or he was lying. A rational person doesn't require evidence to know that there is no theistic god for the same reason that he requires no evidence to know that his hand won't magically turn into a shovel if he puts it in a bucket of salty water at midnight on December 26 2008. At present, neither claims have evidence for or against them, but they are both
a priori extremely implausible.
the basic idea of being an agnostic theist is
1) holding the position it is impossible to know whether there is a god or not as it is not a falsifiable concept. (Agnostic)
2) Choosing to believe/have faith in god. (Theist)
The first does not at all support the second, but it does not contradict it either.
It does contradict it.
In this post I've established the following:
(1) There is no distinction between the
mental state of believing something on faith and the mental state of believing something because of evidence. That is, there is a difference with regard to how a person came to hold these beliefs, but once the belief is actually believed, a faith-based belief and an evidence-based belief will influence the person's thinking processes and actions in precisely the same way.
(2) All beliefs, even those that you call knowledge (such as "If I put my hand in a fire it will hurt") are probabilistic in nature.
(3) Being dismissive of a claim is logically equivalent to believing that it is false (with a high certainty percentage).
(4) Acknowledging that there is no evidence for or against a claim doesn't necessarily mean that we should not be dismissive of it.
Without anyone having evidence for or against the following claims, we
should not be dismissive of the claim that there is a living being in my garage (~50% likelihood), but we
should be somewhat skeptical of the claim that there is a black cat in my garage (~2% likelihood), and we
should be very dismissive of the claim that there is a dragon in my garage (~0.0000001% likelihood). That the suggested percentages are somewhat subjective evaluations doesn't matter; the important point is that they are true
relative to one another (i.e. whatever the likelihood is that there's a dragon in my garage, it is certainly much lower than the likelihood that there is a black cat in there).
To acknowledge, as you do, that there is no evidence for or against a theistic god means that you also acknowledge that the approximate likelihood that the theistic god exists is somewhere between 50% and 0.000...01%.
However, that you believe that a version of the theistic god exists means that the probability that you assign to this god is a lot higher than 50%. If you believe in it strongly enough to waste hours of your life praying to God and wondering if you're doing God's will, it has to be close to 99%.
99% does not equal 50%. That's where the contradiction lies. You strongly believe in something that is very likely to be false.