Even an MMTer can figure it out. If the market is flooded with unwanted supply, prices will fall (yields will spike)... at this point the Fed will probably have to step in in its current ad-hoc function of "buyer of last resort". The problem is that the value of the dollar is inversely related to the size of the Fed balance sheet. Does not bode well for the US.
So you're saying that if China sells all of its Treasuries, the value of the dollar will plummet, and China will find itself the recipient of a lot of worthless dollars? Why would China swap Treasuries with value for relatively worthless dollars? And if the dollar becomes worthless, not only is China holding a bunch of worthless dollars, but China's exports
also take a hit. Bad move for China.
But that's not right. If China sells its Treasuries, then somebody else owns them, and China owns dollars. It's an asset swap, and that's about the extent of it:
If China decided to unload their holdings of U.S. Treasuries in a low inflation environment then my guess is that savvy bond traders would gladly scoop them up and exchange their paper dollars for something that generates a real return. China would be left holding a bunch of dead presidents that just sit there collecting dust and losing purchasing power. So what?
http://pragcap.com/what-if-china-sells-all-their-u-s-treasuries
As you note, the Fed can mitigate any pressure on interest rates from a sudden sell off, if it so chooses.
And here is
the Congressional Research Service's take on it:
Since China held about $1.6 trillion of U.S. private and public securities (largely U.S. Treasury securities) as of June 2012, any reduction in its U.S. holdings could potentially be large. If there were a large reduction in its holdings, the effect on the U.S. economy would still depend on whether the reduction was gradual or sudden. It should be emphasized that economic theory suggests that a slow decline in the trade deficit and dollar would not be troublesome for the overall economy. In fact, a slow decline could even have an expansionary effect on the economy, if the decrease in the trade deficit had a more stimulative effect on aggregate demand in the short run than the decrease in investment and other interest-sensitive spending resulting from higher interest rates. Historical experience seems to bear this out—the dollar declined by about 40% in real terms and the trade deficit declined continually in the late 1980s, from 2.8% of GDP in 1986 to nearly zero during the early 1990s. Yet economic growth was strong throughout the late 1980s.
A potentially serious short-term problem would emerge if China decided to suddenly reduce their liquid U.S. financial assets significantly. The effect could be compounded if this action triggered a more general financial reaction (or panic), in which all foreigners responded by reducing their holdings of U.S. assets. The initial effect could be a sudden and large depreciation in the value of the dollar, as the supply of dollars on the foreign exchange market increased, and a sudden and large increase in U.S. interest rates, as an important funding source for investment and the budget deficit was withdrawn from the financial markets. The dollar depreciation by itself would not cause a recession since it would ultimately lead to a trade surplus (or smaller deficit), which expands aggregate demand. (Empirical evidence suggests that the full effects of a change in the exchange rate on traded goods take time, so the dollar may have to “overshoot” its eventual depreciation level in order to achieve a significant adjustment in trade flows in the short run.) However, a sudden increase in interest rates could swamp the trade effects and cause (or worsen) a recession. Large increases in interest rates could cause problems for the U.S. economy, as these increases reduce the market value of debt securities, causing prices on the stock market to fall, undermining efficient financial intermediation, and jeopardizing the solvency of various debtors and creditors. Resources may not be able to shift quickly enough from interest-sensitive sectors to export sectors to make this transition fluid. The Federal Reserve could mitigate the interest rate spike by reducing short-term interest rates, although this reduction would influence long-term rates only indirectly, and could worsen the dollar depreciation [EV: i.e., increase aggregate demand, which is sorely needed right now] and increase inflation [EV: which is currently persistently below target]. In March 2007, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke reportedly stated in a letter to Senator Shelby that “because foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury securities represent only a small part of total U.S. credit market debt outstanding, U.S. credit markets should be able to absorb without great difficulty any shift of foreign allocations.”
U.S. financial markets experienced exceptional turmoil beginning in August 2007. Over the following year, the dollar declined by almost 8% in inflation-adjusted terms--a decline that was not, in itself, disruptive. But as the turmoil deepened and spread to the rest of the world in 2008, the value of the dollar began rising. Interest rates on U.S. Treasuries fell close to zero, implying excessive investor demand. Other interest rates also remained low, although access to credit was limited for some. Although comprehensive data will not be available for some time, a “sudden stop” in capital inflows does not appear to have been a feature of the downturn. Problems experienced in U.S. financial markets over the past few years have been widely viewed as “once in a lifetime” events. If these events failed to cause a sudden flight from U.S. assets and an unwinding of the current account deficit by China or other countries, it is hard to imagine what would.
Doesn't sound too worrisome. In fact, it almost sounds
beneficial given current economic circumstances.
As to the size of the Fed balance sheet,
uh oh. I take it only one of us is worried about this, and it ain't me.
I find it funny that you are so fearful of government debt, yet are so hostile to the proposition that the government stop creating or significantly reduce its creation of it. The US can always borrow at 0% interest. Whatever rate it decides to pay on the savings accounts it offers to the public (US Treasuries) is by choice.