The PRC may not wish to settle these disputes violently, but it needs to maintain the option of doing so, and Chinas leaders cannot feel confident that their non-nuclear forces are equal to the task. Although the various branches of the PLA are over two million strong, its deficiencies in troop skills, electronics, naval power, and modern aircraft make its numerical strength misleading. Not only is the PRC ill-equipped to fight the United States, it possesses only marginal advantages over such rivals as Japan, India, and the ROC.
The 1991 Gulf War provides a case study of large-scale combat under contemporary conditions. Chinese military thinkers have investigated it thoroughly. Like many other observers, the Chinese were impressed with the way the Western coalition used information technology to hamstring its Iraqi foes. Chinas strategists were undoubtedly disturbed by the fact that Iraqs forces had relied on Soviet-designed weapon systems much like the ones in the PRCs own arsenal. Like their counterparts in other countries, Chinese military writers explored the possibility that developments in sensors, communications equipment, and precision-guided munitions (PGMs) had paved the way for a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in which technologically adept armed forces would possess an insuperable advantage over their opponents.
...For any country with an interest in the RMA, the lack of C I systems is devastating. The lack of signal processing and transmission equipment capable of resisting enemy electronic warfare is almost equally so. Chinas deficiencies in optical and electronic systems sharply limit its ability to develop precision-guided munitions as well. ...
Chinese analysts did not attribute the coalitions victory over Iraq in 1991 to technology alone. Western forces also benefitted fromthe individual proficiency of their soldiers, the cohesion and teamwork displayed by their units, and the tactical abilities of their commanders. Here also, the Chinese appear to have cause for concern. From the 1980s onward, the PRC has been reducing the size of its armed forces in the hope that this will free the resources necessary to provide improved training, better living conditions, and more plentiful equipment for those who remain.
The PRC has imported four Kilo-class submarines fromRussia, along with two Sovremenny-class destroyers. Beijing expects to receive another two Sovremennys in 2005, along with another eight Kilos at an unspecified future point. 15 China also appears to be attempting to build the Kilo in its own shipyards. 16 Neither type of vessel is at the forefront of maritime technology, but the Kilo is quiet enough to challenge Western anti-submarine warfare (ASW) systems, and the Sovremenny carries the potent Sunburn anti-ship missile.
The strength of a contemporary fleet, however, lies in the ability of its ships to protect one another with their defensive systems, and to combine their efforts in the attack. Chinas deficiencies in C 4 I 2 systems sharply limit the PLANs ability to achieve such cooperation. The fact that over half the PRCs major surface combatants lack surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) means that they could not protect themselves or each other against enemy aircraft and missiles even if they acquired the C 4 I 2 gear. 17 Moreover, much of naval warfare revolves around attempts to detect the enemy without being detected. Chinas lack of modern sensors and electronic countermeasures hampers it in this area as well.
Beijing has more ships than many of its opponents, but its numerical advantages are modest. The PRC has 63 major surface combatants of uneven quality. 18 Japan has 54, most of which are more heavily armed and all of which are technologically up to date. The ROC has 32 vessels, which, again, carry modern equipment. India has 29, mainly equipped with Russian or Soviet systems, but one of Indias ships is an aircraft carrier.
Submarines are the traditional weapon of a second-rate naval power, and China has amassed a force of 69 such vessels. The PLANs underwater fleet is formidable, but it is hardly invincible. Chinas domestically produced submarines lack the anechoic tiles that give the Kilo its stealth. 19 Also, over half of Chinas submarine forces consist of obsolete Romeo-class boats, many of which may be unseaworthy. 2
The PRC does have a respectable ability to move its ground forces by sea. Astudy by the US Army War College suggests that the PLAcould land a full division of 10,000 to 14,000 troops in the first wave of an amphibious invasion, and analysts believe that the PRC armed forces could move 40,000 personnel onto the beachhead in a follow-up operation. 21 If the PRC used its assets creatively, it might be able to transport even larger numbers. One must, however, weigh the PRCs transport capabilities against the difficulties the PLANwould face in protecting its troopships at sea, the fact that the ROChas prepared extensively to deal with an invasion, the fact that the PRCs more powerful rivals have land armies numbering in the hundreds of thousands, and the inherent difficulties of amphibious operations.
The PRCs combat aircraft are also superannuated, which exacerbates the problems of the PLAN. Again, the PRC is compensating for this weakness by importing up-to-date equipment fromRussia, notably the Su-27 and Su-30. The PRC also is developing the ability to produce at least the Su-27 in its own factories. 22 Nevertheless, to quote analysts Bernard D. Cole and Paul H. B. Godwin, By the time China is capable of producing Su-27s without Russian assistance, it is likely that Harlan Jencks assessment, made in the late 1970s, that Chinas J-6/MiG-19 was the most highly perfected obsolescent combat aircraft in the world will yet again apply. 23 PRC air forces have a poor reputation for maintenance, logistics, and training. 24 The PRC is beginning to develop aerial refueling capabilities, but most of its planes remain tied to their bases in mainland China. 25 Russia has offered to lease the PRC a trio of Airborne Early Warning aircraft and to train Chinese aircrews to operate them. 26 Nevertheless, it seems safe to say that PRC commanders suffer from serious handicaps in both their ability to monitor the skies and their ability to coordinate operations by their own aircraft.
The PRC currently has 128 Su-27s and Su-30s. The rest of its air armada, totaling more than 2,000 planes, consists of inferior aircraft flown by relatively inexperienced pilots and generally confined to operations within unrefueled flight range of their bases. Japan, by contrast, has 360 combat aircraft, including 130 F-15s. The ROChas 511, including 57 Mirage-2000s and 146 F-16s. India has 736, including 20 Sea Harriers, 28 Su-30s, 228 MiG-29s, and 40 Mirage-2000s. 28 The US Navy deploys 50 modern tactical aircraft on a single aircraft carrier, and typically maintains four such vessels in the Pacific Ocean at any given time. 29
In principle, nuclear weapons provide an excellent backstop for the PRCs national strategy. Beijing, however, denies seeing nuclear weapons in those terms. According to the PRCs national defense White Paper of 2002: China consistently upholds the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons and adopts an extremely restrained attitude toward the development of nuclear weapons. China has never participated in any nuclear arms race and never deployed nuclear weapons abroad. Chinas limited nuclear counterattack ability is entirely for deterrence against possible nuclear attacks by other countries. 32 When Mao Zedong initially called on his people to develop nuclear weapons, he did, indeed, seemto be thinking primarily in terms of countering the nuclear forces of others. We also need the atom bomb, Mao stated in 1956. If our nation does not want to be intimidated, we have to have this thing. 33 Mao was not, however, squeamish about what nuclear weapons can do. When the Italian communist leader Palmiro Togliatti confided his fear that the Cold War might end in the nuclear destruction of Europe, Mao responded, Who said Europe should survive? 34