Only a few weeks ago, the Ninth Circuit commanded otherwise: It is well established that evidence of purpose beyond the face of the challenged law may be considered in evaluating Establishment and Equal Protection Clause claims. Washington, 847 F.3d at 116768 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993) (Official action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality.); Larson, 456 U.S. at 25455 (holding that a facially neutral statute violated the Establishment Clause in light of legislative history demonstrating an intent to apply regulations only to minority religions); and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 26668 (1977) (explaining that circumstantial evidence of intent, including the historical background of the decision and statements by decisionmakers, may be considered in evaluating whether a governmental action was motivated by a discriminatory purpose)). The Supreme Court has been even more emphatic: courts may not turn a blind eye to the context in which [a] policy arose. McCreary Cty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005) (citation and quotation signals omitted).13