XiaNaphryz
LATIN, MATRIPEDICABUS, DO YOU SPEAK IT
http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/assessing-what-we-know-about-the-new-cba/
http://deadspin.com/mlb-all-star-game-will-no-longer-determine-world-series-1789553195
After nearly a year’s worth of negotiation sessions, and with little more than three hours remaining before the deadline, Major League Baseball’s owners and players came to terms on a new collective bargaining agreement Wednesday evening. Not only does this agreement avert a possible work stoppage, but it also means that teams will head into next week’s Winter Meetings with a better sense of the economic ground rules under which they’ll be operating in the coming seasons.
It will be at least a few weeks, if not a couple months, before the final written version of the new CBA is released publicly. Indeed, while the owners and players reached a consensus on the core components of the deal last night, many of those verbal agreements must still be reduced to writing, a process that will take some time.
Still, many of the core components of the deal have already been reported in the press.
Duration of the New CBA
To begin, the new agreement will last for five years, covering the 2017-2021 seasons. This means that by the time the next CBA expires, MLB will have enjoyed an unprecedented 26 years of uninterrupted labor peace. Considering the state of the sport’s labor relations following the 1994-95 players’ strike, that is quite an impressive accomplishment for the game.
Luxury Tax
The new CBA’s modifications to the luxury-tax system may represent the most significant victory for the owners in the new agreement. As Ken Rosenthal reported last night, the luxury-tax threshold will rise from the existing $189 million to $195 million in 2017. From there, the threshold will go up to $197 million, $206 million, $209 million, and $210 million, respectively, over the final four years of the CBA.
In addition, the penalties that clubs will pay for exceeding the luxury-tax threshold will also be adjusted in the new agreement. While teams modestly eclipsing the threshold will reportedly continue to incur penalties roughly approximate to those under the previous agreement — with fines ranging from 17.5% to 50.0% depending on how many years in a row the club has exceeded the threshold — any franchise that exceeds the limit by $20 million or more will now be subjected to an additional, supplemental tax of an extra 12%. Meanwhile, those franchises exceeding the limit by $40 million or more will potentially be subject to an even larger surcharge, resulting in a total tax of upwards of 90%.
While the modest increases to the luxury-tax threshold will provide some incremental benefit to the players, it’s hard to see these changes as anything but a win for the owners. As I discussed last year, the luxury tax is a major factor in the precipitous decline of the players’ share of total league revenues over the last 10-15 years. In particular, whereas the luxury-tax threshold was originally set at a level approximating roughly 90% of the average MLB team’s share of overall league revenues back in 2003, in recent years it has dropped to a level representing less than 65% of the average team’s revenue share.
As a result, the luxury tax now operates in many respects as a de facto salary cap for most teams, even those in the largest markets that have traditionally been the primary drivers of payroll growth in the sport.
Based on the terms of the deal reported last night, the new CBA will do little to reverse these trends.
Free-Agent Compensation
The players did secure a modest victory by persuading the owners to agree to a substantial modification of the qualifying-offer system for free agents beginning in the 2017-18 offseason. (The existing system will remain in place for the current offseason.) Specifically, beginning next winter, if a team extends to a player a qualifying offer, only to see him sign with another club, then the former team will receive a compensatory draft pick only if the player then signs a contract valued at $50 million or more. The specific pick received by the former team will reportedly depend on the size of the market in which it plays.
Meanwhile, also beginning next year, any team signing a free agent who received a qualifying offer will no longer be at risk of losing their first-round draft pick. Instead, under the terms of the new deal, teams whose payrolls are in excess of the luxury-tax threshold will be required to forfeit a second- and fifth-round draft pick, along with $1 million of their international-signing-bonus allotment (as discussed further below); teams under the luxury-tax threshold will be docked a third-round pick.
The rest of the qualifying offer system will reportedly remain unchanged, with Ken Rosenthal reporting that players must still remain on their former team’s roster for the entire season in order for the club to receive a compensatory draft pick. Similarly, the dollar value for the qualifying offer will continue to be determined based on the average of the salaries of the game’s top 125 players.
International Draft
Although the creation of an international draft had been expected to be one of the major sticking points of the CBA negotiations, the owners reportedly moved away from that demand earlier in the week after receiving considerable pushback from the union. Instead, the new CBA will reportedly focus on tweaking the existing international signing rules by creating firmer spending limits that teams will no longer be able to exceed. In particular, Jayson Stark has reported that, under the new agreement, each team will receive a bonus pool of around $5 million to spend on amateur international talent.
From a bargaining perspective, this seems like a reasonable compromise on the issue. The players can hang their hat on the fact that they were able to avoid subjecting amateur international players to a draft; from the league’s perspective, meanwhile, the owners will have attained some additional level of cost certainty with respect to amateur talent acquisition. That having been said, whether these new changes are ultimately sufficient to fix what most observers agreed had become broken system will likely depend on how the new spending limits are implemented, and how strictly they are enforced.
Roster Size
Although it looked earlier this week as if the new CBA would expand the size of each team’s active roster from 25 to 26 players, with some corresponding reductions to the size of the 40-man active rosters in September, the final agreement will reportedly maintain the pre-existing roster limits. As a result, those who were hoping that the new agreement would bring an end to the spectacle of expanded September rosters — resulting in as many as 58 players appearing in a single game — are likely to be disappointed.
http://deadspin.com/mlb-all-star-game-will-no-longer-determine-world-series-1789553195
Home-field advantage in the World Series will no longer be decided by which league wins the All-Star Game. Instead, World Series game 1, 2, 6, and 7 will be played in the ballpark of the pennant-winner with the better record.
(Players on the winning team will be rewarded with cash bonuses, which will be, for the vast majority of them, a much bigger incentive than home-field advantage for their league’s eventual champion ever was.)
This is as it should be, and yet, it has never been this way in the history of baseball: In the early days the site of Game 7 was decided by a coin flip, and from 1925 through 2002, home-field advantage alternated between leagues each year.
But the 2002 All-Star Game ended in a tie, and a befuddled Bud Selig, embarrassed that it happened in his native Milwaukee set out to make sure it would never happen again.
Starting in 2003, the clubs voted unanimously to have the All-Star Game determine where the World Series would open up: the much-derided “This Time it Counts” tagline was born. But it always felt like a solution in search of a problem. The circumstances that led to the 2002 tie were uncommon—it had only happened once before, in a rain-shortened game—and could have been addressed with minor tweaks, like expanded rosters and contingency pitchers held back for extra innings (both of which were eventually put into place anyway).
Yet the arrangement was made permanent. The American League won 11 of 14 All-Star Games played with home-field advantage on the line, and the team with home-field advantage won nine of 14 World Series.
It always felt arbitrary, even more than a coin toss would have: the Cubs, with MLB’s best record, won their championship on the road in a Game 7 held in Cleveland only because San Francisco’s Johnny Cueto got knocked around by Kansas City’s Eric Hosmer and Salvador Perez in a mid-July exhibition.
And now it’s gone, and a generation from now it’s going to be very weird to think back on this 14-year experiment and remember that it was real. The All-Star Game will continue to be fun: friendly, low-stakes fun, the way it was always meant to be.