For a moment, Bair seemed a little surprised, too, by the words that had tumbled out. She took a sip of her latte and looked straight ahead, deep in thought.
Do you really think they should have let Bear fail? I asked.
When she put her drink down, her hesitation was gone. Lets face it, she said. Bear Stearns was a second-tier investment bank, with what? around $400 billion in assets? Im a traditionalist. Banks and bank-holding companies are in the safety net. Thats why they have deposit insurance. Investment banks take higher risks, and they are supposed to be outside the safety net. If they make enough mistakes, they are supposed to fail. So, yes, I was amazed when they saved it. I couldnt believe it. When they told me about it, I said: Guess what: Investment banks fail.
...
Curbing subprime-lending abuses should have been the job of the Federal Reserve, which has a consumer division. But the Fed chairman, Alan Greenspan, with his profound distaste for regulation, could not have been less interested. The other bank regulators, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which oversees national banks, and the Office of Thrift Supervision, which regulates the savings-and-loan industry, should have cared, too. But their responses to the growing problem were at best tepid and at worst hostile. (The O.C.C. actually used its federal powers to block efforts by states to curb subprime abuses.) By the time Bair got to Washington, the O.C.C. had spent a year devising voluntary subprime guidance for the banks it regulated, but it had not yet gotten around to issuing that guidance.
The F.D.I.C. jumped into the breach. Bair knew the issue well, because during her time at Treasury, when the industry was much smaller, she tried, unsuccessfully, to get the subprime lenders to agree to halt their worst practices. Now she was hearing that things had become much worse. Bair instructed the F.D.I.C. to buy an expensive database that listed all the subprime loans in the mortgage-backed bonds that Wall Street was selling to investors. She was shocked by what she saw. All the practices that we looked at back in 2001 and 2002, which we thought were predatory things like steep payment resets and abusive prepayment penalties had gone mainstream, she said.