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[Dilbert]

I think that virtually everyone arguing on behalf of there being "free will" is doing so with the belief that there is a god, or some sort of supernatural force in the universe.

That's not true.

 

[McLesterolBeast]

Ok, i retract that. _I_ think that it ought to be a required assumption to rationalize free will.

 

[xabre]

That's not true.

At the very least, you must admit, it is an argument from emotion and arrogance. Those who oppose determinism cannot stand the possibility that their actions are governed by factors they cannot control. It is the long held desire, often of the religious, to place man on a pedestal and say we have so much control over our destiny that we can defy the very laws of nature to this end; and that to satisfy this claim, abstract, unmeasurable and unprovable concepts such as to simply 'will' an action completely free of observable casualty are invented, concepts that belong in the realm of theology, not science. I'll reply to the rest of yours and Loki's arguments later on tonight.

 

[Loki]

Just so you know, the notion of the gestalt is not exclusive to human thought, but can be seen in such diverse fields as computer programming/AI, biology (even relatively simple organisms exhibit this in both their individual and communal behaviors), art/music (how do line and form alone, or timbre and pitch, determine the quality of a painting or symphony?) and, from what I hear, mathematics; in such fields, the concept of "gestalt" is commonly referred to as "emergent features". There's a nice, if lengthy, overview of the concept seen here. It doesn't come down on one side or the other, but really shows you the scope of the issue, particularly as it relates to matter and its aggregates. "Free will" (indeed, consciousness itself) can rightly be seen as an emergent property of our particular physical constitution, and is thus irreducible to the mere cause and effect that mechanistic models suppose. Is this certain? No-- but it is tenable, seeing as how such emergent phenomena are witnessed in many different areas of study. As yet another example, the entirety of group dynamics is largely concerned with such emergent behaviors.


I just didn't want you to get the idea that I was using the notion of "novel properties/features which are greater than the sum of their parts" (i.e., "gestalt"/emergent features) as an "out" in the argument without basis, as if human consciousness/"will" was the only place where we witness such a thing.

 

[Hitokage]

I'm not really read up on this debate, but it would seem to be important to take random causes and chaotic systems into account. Even if things are ultimately predictable, there's still an underlying layer of randomness on the quantum level which pretty much fucks up the idea of there being a deterministic "destiny" or whatever. That is, of course, assuming that quantum behavior isn't really just a product of hidden variables or information loss... but then I wonder if free will isn't the same situation. Is thought truly spontaneous or does it only seem that way due to our (current?) inability to perceive brain activity, either our own or anyone elses, in its totality?

Now, I understand that "do we have free will" is a different question from "what is free will", "is free will total?"*, or "why do we have it", but still.. it almost seems that this whole debate is one big "argument from adverse consequences" clusterfuck. People siding with what they deem to be most inviolable.


* This is probably "no", given the presence of snap-decisions and the effectiveness of chemical influence.

 

[Dilbert]

At the very least, you must admit, it is an argument from emotion and arrogance.

So let me get this straight -- anyone arguing against you must be emotional and arrogant?

For the record, I am NOT arguing that free will exists. I am arguing that YOUR argument about determinism has major problems. I've already said that other possibilities exist other than determinism and free will. If you think that I have any illusions about man being special in the universe, then you're wrong.

Furthermore, this has NOTHING to do with either religion OR science. I'm not terribly impressed with your ability to read and comprehend so far...hopefully you can improve.

 

[Socreges]

Wow, so much to digest. I'll read what I've missed and respond in a couple days when this stuff becomes my top priority.

Thanks for replying, everyone. Not to suggest you're doing it for my sake, but I'm still grateful.

 

[Drexon]

I'm not really read up on this debate, but it would seem to be important to take random causes and chaotic systems into account. Even if things are ultimately predictable, there's still an underlying layer of randomness on the quantum level which pretty much fucks up the idea of there being a deterministic "destiny" or whatever. That is, of course, assuming that quantum behavior isn't really just a product of hidden variables or information loss... but then I wonder if free will isn't the same situation. Is thought truly spontaneous or does it only seem that way due to our (current?) inability to perceive brain activity, either our own or anyone elses, in its totality?

About this. According to quantum physics every time you try to conduct an experiment even if you have exactly the same variables, you'll get another result. This is in theory. What quantum physicists can't do is send some kind of observator back in time, that doesn't affect anything (heh), to observe if an experiment went just as it did last time. My friend, the quantum physisist, suggests that free will subsides within that same randomness you speak of. "Just take the randomness and apply it to larger and larger systems" he says. I don't know. It sounds pretty far fetched if you ask me. What's wierd though is that he's also admitted that if he knew the exact position of everything in the universe (and was infinately smart) he could predict the outcome until the end.

 

[NLB2]

To know an object I must be able to prove its possibility, either
from its actuality as attested by experience, or a priori by means of
reason. But I can think whatever I please, provided only that I do
not contradict myself, that is, provided my concept is a possible
thought. This suffices for the possibility of the concept, even though
I may not be able to answer for there being, in the sum of all possi-
bilities, an object corresponding to it. But something more is re-
quired before I can ascribe to such a concept objective validity, that
is, real possibility; the former possibility is merely logical. This some-
thing more need not, however, be sought in the theoretical sources of
knowledge; it may lie in those that are practical.
In that case all things in general, as far as they are
efficient causes, would be determined by the principle of caus-
ality and consequently by the mechanism of nature. I could
not, therefore, without palpable contradiction, say of one and
the same being, for instance the human soul, that its will is free
and yet is subject to natural necessity, that is, is not free. For
I have taken the soul in both propositions in one and the same
sense, namely as a thing in general, that is, as a thing in itself;
and save by means of a preceding critique, could not have done
otherwise. But if our Critique is not in error in teaching that
the object is to be taken in a twofold sense, namely as appear-
ance and as thing in itself; if the deduction of the concepts of
understanding is valid, and the principle of causality there-
fore applies only to things taken in the former sense, namely,
in so far as they are objects of experience -- these same objects,
taken in the other sense, not being subject to the principle --
then there is no contradiction in supposing that one and the
same will is, in the appearance, that is, in its visible acts,
necessarily subject to the law of nature, and so far not free,
while yet, as belonging to a thing in itself, it is not subject
to that law, and is therefore free. My soul, viewed from the
latter standpoint, cannot indeed be known by means of specu-
lative reason (and still less through empirical observation);
and freedom as a property of a being to which I attribute effects
in the sensible world, is therefore also not knowable in any
such fashion. For I should then have to know such a being as
determined in its existence, and yet as not determined in time --
which is impossible, since I cannot support my concept by any
intuition. But though I cannot know, I can yet think freedom;
that is to say, the representation of it is at least not self-con-
tradictory, provided due account be taken of our critical dis-
tinction between the two modes of representation, the sensible
and the intellectual, and of the resulting limitation of the pure
concepts of understanding and of the principles which flow
from them.

There you have it. For all the discussion on the subject of freedom it suprises me that I have not yet come across anything refuting Kant's conclusion.

 

[NLB2]

My friend, the quantum physisist, suggests that free will subsides within that same randomness you speak of. "Just take the randomness and apply it to larger and larger systems" he says. I don't know. It sounds pretty far fetched if you ask me. What's wierd though is that he's also admitted that if he knew the exact position of everything in the universe (and was infinately smart) he could predict the outcome until the end.

I think your friend the quantum physicist contradicted himself.

 

[xabre]

So let me get this straight -- anyone arguing against you must be emotional and arrogant?

Not at all. The typical traits of those that oppose determinism are that they can't seem stand the concept of being relegated to the lowly status of 'biological robot' with illusionary free will, and thus emotion and arrogance plays a big part in their opposition to it.

For the record, I am NOT arguing that free will exists. I am arguing that YOUR argument about determinism has major problems. I've already said that other possibilities exist other than determinism and free will.

Perhaps you should put forward a case for these other possibilities then (I'd be interested to discuss them) instead of sitting back and condemning other peoples world views while offering no alternative. The topic itself is about a comparison between the two viewpoints which I made, all you’ve done is a poor job of attempting to condemn determinism and offered no alternative.

Furthermore, this has NOTHING to do with either religion OR science. I'm not terribly impressed with your ability to read and comprehend so far...hopefully you can improve.

Neither am I with yours (and this quote of yours reeks of arrogance ironically enough...not surprising either). Just above you claimed that I considered you emotional and arrogant which is certainly not what I said, I said your argument opposing determinism is one that is emotional and arrogant, big difference. And for the record all emcompassing world views like determinism and free will have everything to do with religion and science, and to say otherwise is absurd.

 

[Dilbert]

So are you going to respond to my longer post, or are you just going to keep dodging and pissing me off?

 

[White Man]

I vote that Loki be BANNED from GAF conversation until he responds to my story outlines.

 

[NLB2]

So are you going to respond to my longer post, or are you just going to keep dodging and pissing me off?

Is anyone going to read my post that solves the problem? :-(

 

[impirius]

Is anyone going to read my post that solves the problem? :-(

It took me a couple of reads before I understood it (as is the case for most things in which there are more semicolons and dashes than periods*), but I can get behind what Kant is saying, as he seems to be putting the vague idea that I had into eloquent, precise terms: things may have qualities which can't be measured by pure logic or reason. There is more to it than we can quantify. This has to be the crux of the argument for free will, right?

Spoiler

* no, I didn't count

 

[adam20]

Oh how I hate philisophy. People like to support radical crazy unrealistic ideas and discuss semantics with no end in sight. Philiosphy has no answers as the teachers dont discuss answers or the most popular answers... because there supposedly aren't any. Whatever. Free will exists otherwize nothing would exist. Philosophy is such a terrible course. I didn't learn a single thing except how many wackos existed .

 

[NLB2]

Not really. Kant divided the world into two parts - the phenomena and the noumena (that is those things that are sensible and those things that exist as things-in-themselves). The soul cannot be known by "speculative reason and still less through empirical observation" (or basically being a noumenon instead of a phenomenon) and freedom is something one can only knowingly attribute to something that exists sensibly. Also, the soul being free isn't self contradictory so the sould may or may not be free. Bascically what Kant is saying is what Wittgenstein later repeats in the Tractatus: "Whereof one may not speak thereof one must remain silent"
Its beyond the faculty of human cognition to know whether or not we are free so why do we keep on trying to find out?

My soul, viewed from the
latter standpoint, cannot indeed be known by means of specu-
lative reason (and still less through empirical observation);
and freedom as a property of a being to which I attribute effects
in the sensible world, is therefore also not knowable in any
such fashion. For I should then have to know such a being as
determined in its existence, and yet as not determined in time --
which is impossible, since I cannot support my concept by any
intuition. But though I cannot know, I can yet think freedom;
that is to say, the representation of it is at least not self-con-
tradictory, provided due account be taken of our critical dis-
tinction between the two modes of representation, the sensible
and the intellectual, and of the resulting limitation of the pure
concepts of understanding and of the principles which flow
from them.

 

[NLB2]

Free will exists otherwize nothing would exist.

Care to explain this?

 

[McLesterolBeast]

adam20
Member
(Today, 06:44 AM)
Reply | Quote

That pretty much explains it.

 

[fugimax]

Not sure if this will help, but here's a little Pragmatism on from James for you..
(Note: I haven't read the thread completely...excuse me if this has been posted)

William James deals quite a bit with the idea of free will, and he has a nice example of explaining God in a system which is not purely deterministic. Most conceptions of God, necessarily, describe an all-knowing and infinite God. Indeterminists, then, can't possibly believe in such a God...because they believe they have free-will. If their will is determined beforehand...well, you get the idea.

James likens the world to chess, and God to an expert chess player. Imagine a game in which a chess novice goes up against a grand-champion chess player. The outcome of the game is certain. The expert most certainly will win -- he doesn't know how he will win, as he can't determine which moves the novice will take, but he will, in fact, win.

James relates this to God in the sense that God knows, ultimately, what is and will be. That is, God may know the ultimate outcome of the universe, but he does not necessarily know the path which will lead to it. Now, does this fit the definition of an infinite, all-knowing God? No, not really...but it is probably the closest an indeterminist can come.

Personally, I am an indeterminist. James has a wonderful argument "against" determinism in The Dilemma of Determinism. You can find a summary of its argument here:

http://www.utexas.edu/courses/hilde/Philhandouts/dilemma.html

Briefly, the argument is:

1. One is either a determinist or an indeteminist.
2. Accepting the former requires accepting pessimism or subjectivism
3. I can accept neither
4. Therefore, I must be an indeterminist.

To come to the conclusion in 2, James believes that we all have regret about judgments. What this means is that the universe could have been better off had we not made these regrets. But if one is a determinist, one believes there's no way things could have been different, thus you must accept pessimism (things are the way they are and I can't do anything about it). Object by saying that no, we don't truly regret, then we've admitted the universe has mistakes (we regretted something impossible to regret), and thus there is still a better universe (one in which we did not regret)...thus we must accept Pessimism once more.

And since we can't accept pessimism, we must accept subjectivism to explain away the mistaken regret. Accepting this leads to us believing in no such thing as a truly good or bad act. And this is not acceptable to James, as he believes there are certain acts which are good and certain acts which are bad.

Thus, accepting neither pessimism or subjectivism ... we must embrace indeterminism.

 

[McLesterolBeast]

It is the case that we have less than perfect information and additionally, our 'rational' decisions are often influenced by 'irrational' instincts. Either of those factors may compel us to act in a way that is not in our best overall interests. To regret is not to say that you would do it differently if put in the exact same situation. You could not and would not. To regret is to say that you would do it differently if put in the exact same situation with one exception, that being the new bit of knowledge we regard as regret.

If suggesting that "there's no way things could have been different" is pessimism, then it's tautological to determinism and the entire argument is circular. More likely he means that "things are the way they are and I can't do anything about it". Cant and couldn't are radically different though. You can make things different in future circumstances with knowledge of your past regrets. You could not make things different in the past because you did not yet possess that regret.

 

[fugimax]

To regret is not to say that you would do it differently if put in the exact same situation.

Actually, yes it is.

When you regret something, you wish, via some new knowledge, that you could go back and do things differently. Imagine if you will, jumping off a cliff to your certain death. After you've died and gone to your respect "place" ... you really wish you hadn't have jumped. You don't wish you wouldn't jump from now on (the point is moot, no?), you wish you hadn't jumped then.

If somehow you were presented with another cliff in the future under the same circumstances ... yes, your knowledge may help you then as well. That's not to say I can't regret a moment in my past where I did something stupid.

Determinists, of course, can't handle the idea of this and must claim regret is not genuine regret of a past moment in time, but rather a lesson learned for future situations.

I believe my opinion does in fact differ from James here, though. He only considers a valid regret as one that will help in the future. I do not.

 

[McLesterolBeast]

Wishing for knowledge in hindsight is besides the fact.

For all material purposes, regret is learning a lesson.

You can "wish" that you acted in your now apparent best interest, but who cares? That does absolutely nothing to support the guys view.

The regret itself is the realization that you acted in a less than optimal manner. The effect is that, when put in analogous situations in the future, you will act differently as to satisfy your best interests. This is evidence that the world is unpredictable?

Any regret can be "valid", depending on how you define validity. In the logical sense, it's neither valid or invalid on the basis that you're suggesting. The validity of a regret COULD rougly be seen as whether you actually did/didn't act in your overall interests. That, again, is besides the point.

 

[fugimax]

The regret itself is the realization that you acted in a less than optimal manner.

And this is why you must accept the universe could have been better. Had you acted, in your wrods, "optimally", things would be better. Thus you must accept pessimism.

 

[McLesterolBeast]

My issue with his argument is that pessimism, if defined as such, is acceptable.

Again, to regret is not to say that you would do it differently if put in the exact same situation (as in, without the regret or knowledge). Things could not be better. Things just _would_ have been better.

 

[fugimax]

My issue with his argument is that pessimism, if defined as such, is acceptable.

The argument is a personal one...it's not out to prove anything, but just illustrate the consequences. I am not ok with pessimism. If you are, then you are right, this argument means nothing for you. I merely presented it to show the thread author what the consequences of determinism are.

 

[gblues]

Talk about missing the forest for the fucking trees..

The only reason determinism has any sort of popularity is precisely because it simplifies the world. Actions are no longer good or bad. Personal responsibility? What's that? It's the same logic murderers try to use to justify killing in their heads. "It's not their fault, the ghetto made him do it."

Natural laws go a long way toward explaining the hows and the whats.. but trying to describe the "why" in the same terms is nothing more than lazy hand-waving by people who don't want to admit their shortcomings.

Think of it this way. From a deterministic standpoint, there's no way Bill Gates would have become a multi-billionaire if IBM hadn't chosen Microsoft. However, from an indeterministic standpoint, I believe that Bill Gates would've eventually found success. Maybe it wouldn't be named Microsoft, and maybe it wouldn't be as an operating system, but Bill had (and still has) the smarts and determination to succeed.

Or look at it this way: do you think that the successful people got where they are by luck? Do you think Michael Jordan spun a "Jackpot" on the Wheel of Deterministic Fortune?

Nathan

 

[Socreges]

Talk about missing the forest for the fucking trees..

The only reason determinism has any sort of popularity is precisely because it simplifies the world. Actions are no longer good or bad. Personal responsibility? What's that? It's the same logic murderers try to use to justify killing in their heads. "It's not their fault, the ghetto made him do it."

Natural laws go a long way toward explaining the hows and the whats.. but trying to describe the "why" in the same terms is nothing more than lazy hand-waving by people who don't want to admit their shortcomings.

It could be. But it's pretty simple of you to say it is.

Determinism scares me in that respect. That everything is already pre-dictated. I want the sensation that I am responsible for everything that I do. Anyone who doesn't is hardly human. Yet I may assign myself to determinism because I feel it, at this moment, makes sense to me.

Think of it this way. From a deterministic standpoint, there's no way Bill Gates would have become a multi-billionaire if IBM hadn't chosen Microsoft. However, from an indeterministic standpoint, I believe that Bill Gates would've eventually found success. Maybe it wouldn't be named Microsoft, and maybe it wouldn't be as an operating system, but Bill had (and still has) the smarts and determination to succeed.

Or look at it this way: do you think that the successful people got where they are by luck? Do you think Michael Jordan spun a "Jackpot" on the Wheel of Deterministic Fortune?

Nathan

What? Do you even understand what determinism is?

 

[fugimax]

Determinism scares me in that respect. That everything is already pre-dictated.

Yes, in hard determinism, the only difference between you and a rock is that you move around more and are aware of such movements. Otherwise, you are as powerless as it is.

 

[McLesterolBeast]

Determinism doesn't "excuse" criminal behavior. It just implies that criminal behavior can be explained. Regarding a criminal as "bad" doesnt negate the fact that there is a reason he did what he did (or she). A series of material factors influenced them to commit the crime - and that crime was a factor influencing the governments decision to incarcerate the individual. So long as legal procedings seek to acheive a rational end (interests of society), whether the individual was predetermined to commit the crime or not is immaterial. You can regard a person as immoral if their actions are a consequent of their upbringing... It's no more of a stretch than regarding their actions as a consequent of their upbringing, their genetics, their environment and a near infinite number of other variables that contributed to their personality.

 

[Socreges]

Yes, in hard determinism, the only difference between you and a rock is that you move around more and are aware of such movements. Otherwise, you are as powerless as it is.

I think the most disturbing description that I've read was that we're just observers of a slide-show.

Determinism doesn't "excuse" criminal behavior. It just implies that criminal behavior can be explained. Regarding a criminal as "bad" doesnt negate the fact that there is a reason he did what he did (or she). A series of material factors influenced them to commit the crime - and that crime was a factor influencing the governments decision to incarcerate the individual. So long as legal procedings seek to acheive a rational end (interests of society), whether the individual was predetermined to commit the crime or not is immaterial. You can regard a person as immoral if their actions are a consequent of their upbringing... It's no more of a stretch than regarding their actions as a consequent of their upbringing, their genetics, their environment and a near infinite number of other variables that contributed to their personality.

Determinism CAN excuse behaviour insofar as it considers that circumstance couldn't have happened any differently, as behaviour is determined by nature and nurture.

Anyway, I've got to stop explaining what it is, buying into it more and more, until I read all of the opposing arguments.

 

[gblues]

What? Do you even understand what determinism is?

Let me ask you this: why did you decide to question my understanding of the subject? Was it because Al Gore invented teh intarweb, and someone started the GAF forums, and we both registered at this site, and someone else posted a thread about determinism that we both became involved in?

Or did you flame me because you think I'm a dumbass?

 

[Socreges]

Let me ask you this: why did you decide to question my understanding of the subject? Was it because Al Gore invented teh intarweb, and someone started the GAF forums, and we both registered at this site, and someone else posted a thread about determinism that we both became involved in?

Or did you flame me because you think I'm a dumbass?

I flamed you?

Anyway, because I felt that whatever you were talking about was unrelated to what determinism professes. Now, are you suggesting that what I'm typing at this very moment does not adhere to the "rules" of determinism? Alright, explain.

 

[McLesterolBeast]

If by "excuse" you mean that it can explain, then yes.

If by "excuse" you mean it can let the guy off the hook, then no.

The reason "intent" is relevant to the incarceration of an individual is because of it's predictive value with respect to the future. (if that's where you're going with it)

If they made a decision as a consequent of their upbringing - and we view it as harmful to society, action is taken to preserve the interests of society.

Preserving the interests of society is a rational choice by government acting on behalf of the sum of particular interests.

I don't see where this abstract notion of "excuse" comes into play, or what it actually is to begin with.

 

[Socreges]

I don't see where this abstract notion of "excuse" comes into play, or what it actually is to begin with.

Just that some people may try and exploit the consequences of determinism. You're taking this too far. Let's not moralize this argument.

 

[xabre]

If you sincerely believe that all of your actions are inevitable...how do you get through your day? The clothes you wear, the jobs you take, the people you get involved with...all of the "choices" you think you make are illusory, right? So what is the reason to live? How does that belief help you in any way with your existence?

I'm not using determinism to 'help' my existence, I'm using it to attempt to explain the way I think the universe functions. This is in fact an example of emotion and arrogance in argument that I mentioned earlier, how do I get through the day you ask? As if my feelings have any bearing on the topic at hand. This point that you've made attempts to illustrate that life in a determined universe is pointless so why bother with it (i.e. emotion) and that in order for us not to be pointless we cannot possibly live in a determined universe (i.e. arrogance). Incidentally you confuse determinism with fatalism here, the former simply refers to causality, the latter refers to one actually accepting the fact that everything is predetermined and that their fate (whatever that maybe) is inevitable. I don't really consider myself a fatalist because I don't go around saying, 'well I got an illness so there's no point going to the doctor because I'm going to die anyway' - that's fatalism, yet I do accept that it is ultimately correct, our fate, actions, attitudes, personality, decisions, appearance and illnesses are all predetermined and thus so is our fate. It's important to remember that determinism transcends fatalism, because whether or not one decides to become a fatalist, is itself purely determined by causality.

No, that is NOT the same argument. You're revisiting Berkeley, which is something entirely different. You need to read more closely.

I'm sorry but the point I made sums that argument up nicely. Now I never said it was wrong, I just said that if you applied that line of thinking to determinism then you can just as easily apply it to absolutely anything and in the end solve nothing. Prove to me that gravity electromagnetism on an exact hypothetical clone of Earth on the other side of the universe has the same gravitational or electromagnetic effects on the ground as Earth? We cannot measure this so therefore we can't prove that this is the case; yet we can see the effects of gravity and electromagnetism all around us and it satisfies all the predictions we ask of it, thus it is logical to assume that yes, the gravitational and electromagnetic influence on that planet is the same as on Earth. Just as the case with determinism, we can observe the causality relationship and this relationship holds true when we observe it and as such is logical to accept that causality as universal and all encompassing.

You have it backwards: You say that determinism exists, with causality following as a consequence...but in fact, determinism invokes the idea of causality. In fact, determinism RELIES on the principle that B can necessarily be caused by A.

Of course, perhaps my wording was poor but I certainly never meant causality is a result of determinism, they are one and the same as you said.

If the individual has a role in selecting that outcome, and his/her choice-making mechanism was not constrained, wouldn't it be fair to say that it was a "free" choice?

So this persons brain sits in a vacuum free of determining factors? Then what exactly allows that individual the freedom to ‘will’ a choice? Being purely determinist and materialist I would say this person with their specific genetic composition and their lifelong interaction with their environment led to the specific memories, chemical interactions, neuron pathways and nerve impulses that have ultimate influence over what choice that person makes. Most of our actions are purely unconscious and instinctive acts, only becoming obvious to us when we think about them, scratching ones head or walking are merely natural instinctive, reflex actions. When we do choose, between apples and oranges for example, our choice is simply the reflection of a life full of experiences such as from influences like advertising and social interactions, positive or negative experiences, past memories and so forth. The choice is the result of who and where we are, and what we are is due to factors beyond our control. We don’t choose our nature and nor do we choose our nurture yet these two ultimate forces and their interactions determine the near limitless myriad of variables and influences both internal and external always pushing us in a particular directions in particular circumstances. It is ultimately as simple as an if-else statement in a computer program only multiplied to ridiculous absurdity, although still ultimately the same. This is my answer to what determines choice, it may be oversimplified and short-sighted but it remains an answer, and a logical one at that. Bear in mind your own answer in comparison to this, the fabled ‘choice-making mechanism’, I rest my case.

However, necessary causation isn't a gimme to begin with: How do you know that there is such a thing? What does a "cause" look/sound/feel/smell/taste like? Hume's argument is that a cause is NOT directly perceptible...and if you can't perceive it, then how are you so sure that it exists?

So if I jump in a pool I can't prove I got wet from the water, perhaps the air did it when I got out? If I kick over a cardboard box I can't prove my foot did it, perhaps it was the wind at the very instant I kicked it? You know you're right, I cannot ultimately prove either of these things and yet it seems absurd to dispute them. I can prove that water molecules from the pool bonded to my skin and that my skin temperature is similar to that of the pool. I can also prove that the box went a certain distance depending on the force of my foot, and that I can predict the distance and direction the box will go knowing in advance various variables such as foot direction, velocity and acceleration, air pressure, gravity, wind resistance etc. But yes, lets just throw out the laws of physics and chemistry and satisfy your position of 'you can't ultimately prove it, so don't assume it'.

Free will does NOT rely on the "notion that some mystical, completely undetectable and unmeasurable force allows us the ability to choose free from deterministic influence," and it might be amusing to hear where you got that idea from.

Then what exactly does it rely on Jinx.....oh, you don't know do you? Mate you seem thick on weak rebuttals and thin on ideas of your own.

However, your conclusion to that paragraph is even funnier: the idea of a free will guaranteed by some "mystical force" is so unpalatable to you that you therefore conclude that determinism is the "more logical assumption." Assumption? Weren't you just ripping Loki a new asshole because his arguments weren't aimed at the truth value of determinism, and now you're saying that determinism is an ASSUMPTION? Well, well, well.

Bzzzt wrong Jinx. My use of the word assumption was bearing in mind the fact that necessary casualty is ultimately unprovable as I most certainly agree with. However, as I said before determinism is a logical position to take as we observe the causality relationship universally and to say that this relationship holds true for tress falling into rivers due to lighting yet not to human behaviour is simply taking causality to a point and then saying it doesn't work anymore, pretty silly.

 

[McLesterolBeast]

If you sincerely believe that all of your actions are inevitable...how do you get through your day? The clothes you wear, the jobs you take, the people you get involved with...all of the "choices" you think you make are illusory, right? So what is the reason to live?

Do you choose to believe that there is an unknowable consequent to your choices because it gives you reason to live?

Utility is enough of a reason to enjoy the ride.

The decisions you make are specifically for that end. Rationality is what compels us to act the way we do and what determines our fate. The motivation/cause for each action is precisely what makes life worth living. If the disutility derived from viewing life as futile became sufficiently large to overshadow potential utility in the future, suicide would be your fate.

edit: or you could rationalize on irrational grounds that there is an uknowable end, if that floats your boat.

 

[xabre]

While it may be tempting to try to reduce all actions-- even those that apparently spring from conscious "choice"-- to the sum of their physical antecedents, such a view is not tenable. For instance, though science tries to say that thoughts or emotions are the result of electrochemical signals, the direction of causality has never been adequately established. In other words, does a series of electrochemical signals culminate in our experiencing a "thought", or do our thoughts immediately trigger a cascade of physiological processes, including the electrochemical signals?

If the electrical impulses are a result of thoughts or the 'will' then the question is, what is the 'will'? This is the huge problem with free will, not only does observable determinism contradict this concept, but free will proponents lack the very ability to define what the 'will' even is never mind prove it.

Of course, if it wasn't for causality you wouldn't have even been able to type that paragraph, or did the computer 'will' the characters to appear on screen? This is interesting, if your actions are responsible for causing the computer to display the text then the computer lacks free will which you have. So the question is what makes you so special? The computer is also reliant on electrical signals to process information as you are, yet you are free and it is not, why?

But the point is that we can at least posit a circumstance whereby we could disprove free will, even if it's merely theoretical (i.e., unlikely to actually occur). There is no such circumstance to be proffered for determinism, even theoretically, and so determinism carries the same weight as all the other bunk "theories" I mentioned earlier.

It isn't bunk at all, because we know causality exists, the only question is if it is all encompassing or that at some point it simply stops, the latter being something I don't consider logical. Alternatively we have free will, the ability to simply 'will' a specific action without prior cause, something that seems tantamount to magic, yet seemingly to you is perfectly logical never mind the fact you cannot define what it even is.

Positively false. See above. Try to find a scientific study that has determined the "direction of causality" for thoughts/electrochemical impulses-- you can't do it.

As above, if we consider a thought being the precursor to electrical impulses and brain activity you essentially have something that has emerged from nothing and able to determine between complex choices like 'should I put $10 in that poker machine' or 'buy lunch at Subway or Burger King today'. A view point like this does Occam’s Razor no favours either, especially when you have perfectly logical determining factors such as electrical impulses as a precursor for thought.

 

[McLesterolBeast]

I'd like to know what the alternatives to causality are, if not a divine power?

A few of you alluded to atheistic arguments against determinism; mind giving the general jist of it? Or was it an atheistic defense of free will?

 

[Dilbert]

IOf course, perhaps my wording was poor but I certainly never meant causality is a result of determinism, they are one and the same as you said.

...necessary casualty is ultimately unprovable as I most certainly agree with.

So determinism either requires or is the "same" as causality...yet you finish up by saying that "necessary causality is ultimately unprovable?"

Good day to you, sir...I have nothing more to add.

 

[Dilbert]

A few of you alluded to atheistic arguments against determinism; mind giving the general jist of it? Or was it an atheistic defense of free will?

I was specifically objecting to xabre's argument that free will is only possible if there is some mystical/religious/supernatural/whatever-word-it-was-that-he-used power to guarantee it. It's an especially odd claim, given that the presence of a god with the usual attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence tends to lead to fatalism and the problem of evil.

 

[Zaptruder]

Ok guys.

Even if we accept that there can be freewill...

there's little denying that there's *a lot* of determinism going on regardless.

From your genetic makeup that determines your personality, the way you interact with the world as well as the way the world interacts with you...

all the way upto 'chance' elements that interact with you... such as the chance that a drunken driver was just along the road at a certain time while you were too and smashed into your car...

but in reality that's has also been somewhat predetermined...

the drunk was invited to a friend's party, felt like he had to drink to enjoy the party, feared leaving behind his car in case of break in...

and you happened to be there along a similar causal chain of reasons.


To some... it might seem like there's a good amount of free will involved in his decision to drive drunkenly. In reality it's more like because he had some preingrained notions or whatever beliefs that made it likely... and along with other extraneous factors, caused him to decide him to drive home in a drunken state.


On a grandscale, there's a lot of determinism. We can make relatively accurate predictions even on social matters... despite the massive number of variables that we can't account for. We have very accurate rules that predict the forces governing our physical world.

...

 

[geogaddi]

On the free-will vs determinism ordeal:

there are many viewpoints to determinism and that I notice no one is talking about;

John Lockes/Hume's classical compatibilism vs. contemporary compatibilism or hierarchical and hard/soft compatibilism.

Anyways, this discussion will go nowhere without discussing causations (state-state causations, non-causal theory of agency and quantum events that allow indeterminism (because they are uncaused events).

 

[NLB2]

Nathan am crying.

P.S. I'm talking about myself, not the other guy named Nathan.

 

[xabre]

So determinism either requires or is the "same" as causality...yet you finish up by saying that "necessary causality is ultimately unprovable?"

Only in the same context that gravity, electromagnetism or everything else is ultimately unprovable. In fact I made mention of this several times, and used that Earth clone example to show how nothing can ever be ultimately 100% proven, although we can reasonably conclude at a point that if such theories satisfy all our observations and predictions we can then logically assume they hold true in situations we can’t observe or predict.

Good day to you, sir...I have nothing more to add.

I'm not surprised, your reading and comprehension skills leave much to be desired.

 

[B-B-Bomba!]

Do you choose to believe that there is an unknowable consequent to your choices because it gives you reason to live?

Utility is enough of a reason to enjoy the ride.

The decisions you make are specifically for that end. Rationality is what compels us to act the way we do and what determines our fate. The motivation/cause for each action is precisely what makes life worth living. If the disutility derived from viewing life as futile became sufficiently large to overshadow potential utility in the future, suicide would be your fate.

edit: or you could rationalize on irrational grounds that there is an uknowable end, if that floats your boat.

Thanks for that! I've been having trouble getting to the heart of this throughout my reading of this thread, and this has helped a lot. Sadly I think I can put myself into the camp of those whose boats have to be floated by unknowable ends ...

I had more to add but ... this has been fun! Let's do morality next week!

In fact, what I meant to say was, I think there is only one question in the world, and all other questions are permutations of it. As Stooge so nicely framed Wittgenstein; language is both our framework and our prison for addressing this one radiant, catastrophic query. Quite often we end up chasing other peoples' tails around the place, because they are currently hunched over a different nexus of meta-concerns, from which perspective, although the yawning infinity of the unkown still drives them hogwild, the answers they do possess, and their awful significance in the light and proximity of The Question, convinces them they must possess the ultimate truth of a matter.

OK OK, so 'it all depends on your perspective' is asinine and facile, but like stablemates determinism and solipsism, it can frame better ideas. The morality debate is something different entirely (and I'm sorry, I know it deviates from Socreges' quest for rebuttal), however the more you fellows have talked, the more ones approach to this problem seems inextricable from ones approach to the problem of free will. In fact, I'd say the morality debate is one ring closer into the centre of the great grand question: perhaps it is it, or perhaps it is our closest conception of it. Different schools of thought make attempts on different faces of this treacherous peak, and achieve differing results. For example, I believe the theory of karma can address everything, from morality on down through free will and determinism, if only within narrow limits.

All such fields of argument should be turned on their side so you can read their spine. I think the better question ought to be, why are we faced with this one burning question, spouting hot rivulets of cooling confusion, and why and how are we to answer it? I have to add to this, that I think the answers to these are firmly internal matters, and that, as external discussion must take place through the fog of language, our understanding of, and ability to answer the one great question, is at its purest not in the theories we can lay out and plot before one another, but in our own minds, where our sacred relationship with existence has its root. Of course discussion helps - has helped here - and it is fundamental to our being. However ... I believe we all hold within us the full expulsion of every question ever asked, and all wrestle with it privately, up until our deaths ... Even debates amongst philosophical titans can be viewed as willy-waving contests in this light ...


& BTW, what do I personally think of as the purest linguistic expression of the one great grand question? Simple!














"What the FUCK?"

 

[xabre]

I missed this earlier -

Free will is not falsifiable? That's news to me. Unlike the determinist's assumptions, we all have a notion of our reflexive, ultimate "self" whom we like to imagine calls the shots and makes our choices. Operating under the assumption that such an ultimate "I" exists (which is part and parcel of most free will theories, mind you, so it's entirely relevant), if one's "I" were to look on in horror as their physical self performed some action, then we could disprove free will.

This analogy is flawed. You say the individual would sit back in horror as they observed their physical self performing some action they could not control, forgetting the fact that the individual has to choose to be horrified, or shocked, or distressed. In this scenario the individuals 'will' is constrained but it still exists. Likewise, I can say 'I lack the ability to choose to fly' and as such I can say my 'will' is also constrained, just not as extremely as in your case. The fact is that the only way to disprove freewill would be to prove determinism which cannot be done absolutely as you've said.

 

[Drexon]

xabre am winnar! *adds to discussion and makes universe a better place*

So if the entire human species were to 100% believe in "hard" determinism, what would happen?





Edit: Actually serious and curious to your (everyones) answer.

 

[xabre]

My friend, the quantum physisist, suggests that free will subsides within that same randomness you speak of. "Just take the randomness and apply it to larger and larger systems" he says.

While certainly quantum physics seem to demonstrate randomness and uncaused events, this is not free will even if we accept these events as undetermined (and not determined by a cause we cannot yet detect). Quantum effects (such as the positions of sub-atomic particles) are based upon randomness and probability, and while such effects may result in a causality process which eventually plays a role in human decision making, the person making the decision has no control over how these quantum effects will influence their decision making process as they are purely random. Using quantum physics in support of free will is akin to simply 'willing' the ball on a roulette wheel to land on 00, never mind chance. These are random and probability factors that simply cannot be controlled and little different from any other effect of causality.

So if the entire human species were to 100% believe in "hard" determinism, what would happen?

If everyone took the concept of 'hard' determinism to the nth degree (I don't think much of the 'soft' variety as I've said) and became fatalistic then with the realisation of no absolute morality or responsibility the very foundations of society would most likely collapse and anarchy would ensue. Free will then offers a comfortable illusion, at least if we 'think' we're free we are then able to establish systems of hierarchy, order, responsibility and ethics that would otherwise be redundant from a determinist perspective.

 

[Drexon]

So what you're saying is that "free will" can't be explained by physics, or atleast that quantum physics can't, using the randomness argument?

And I think that if everyone were to accept determinism as truth then people would basically think "nothing I do can change what's going to happen", but that's a double sided coin. If you work hard (well, in theory) you'll get a better life, and if you slack off you'll get a.. slightly better life. So I think humanity would basically continue to function the way it did. I mean, it's not like we haven't come a long way, even though we have a long way to go. Realising you have no control doesn't take away the exitement of what's going to happen tomorrow, so to speak.

In any case, isn't life, from a determinists point of view, just a, well, mistake?