From January, this was a bit regarding the influence data was having in how the Panthers made decisions on the ice:
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A year ago, right around US Thanksgiving, the Panthers ownership and front office team held a summit. The team was foundering. The Panthers were either at .500 or below, near the bottom of their division and there really wasnt a lot of hope.
Even as far back as then, consideration was given to firing Gallant.
But the group came out of their meetings with a series of recommendations to help the coach. Some were analytics based, others simply common sense.
The most shrewd, and data driven, was breaking up Mitchell and Gudbranson who really were the worst possession pairing in the league. Together, their even strength shot-attempt differential was 40.8%.
It meant most games they looked like Alabama playing an FCS school and they werent the Roll Tide part of that equation.
For context, the worst regular defenceman in the league last year was Dan Girardi. His shot attempt differential was 41.7 per cent, the only one sub-42.
The numbers tend to over-complicate things. The reality is Mitchell-Gudbranson, as a thing, sucked and the coach didnt seem to see it.
Another push from the front office, and maybe the one anyone could have come up with, was to marginalize Bolland.
People will always focus on analytics when it comes to the Panthers, but your great grandmother could have watched one Panthers game and told you Bolland was washed.
But Bolland was Gallants second line center, and it kept a ceiling on Trocheck, on the third.
To his credit, Gallant was open to the changes. He made them. Gudbranson played with Brian Campbell and it became one of the teams best pairings. Bolland was scratched, demoted and within a couple of weeks, out of the league. Trochecks minutes immediately jumped.
All of it worked.
The Panthers went on a 17-3 run, including 12 straight Ws, paving the way to those 103 points. Gallant was a Jack Adams finalist.