Opiate said:
Very much agreed. I used an analogy some time ago: let's say I'm a professional Football player. As such, it should be absolutely fair to say that I am good at sports. Now, let's say that Football suddenly falls entirely out of fashion, and I'm forced to quit playing sports or play Basketball. Does anyone seriously think I can simply wake up one day and be incredible at Basketball? I'm good at sports, it should be easy! And yet, despite both careers falling under the monicker of "sport," and despite everyone agreeing that I'm very good at sports, I'm not actually suited to compete in Basketball at the highest levels. It requires slightly different physical characteristics (i.e. taller) and a different skill set that I need to cultivate over years of play.
Similarly, it should be fairly apparent by now that the Wii has a slightly different audience.They still fall under the category of "game," but it's different enough that a large company that's supposed to be "good at making games" may not actually be very good in this case, because it requires a different skill set.
Nintendo faithful don't like to hear this, because it sounds like I'm suggesting that the major third parties focus on the PS3/360 -- and I am, that's exactly what I'm suggesting. It's what they're good at, so stick with it. However, HD faithful don't seem to like the suggestion that these companies have failed on the Wii because they aren't skilled enough, because it implies it's a failing of the companies, rather than of the Wii system. And it is a failling of these companies, but it's a totally understandable one. It's like saying, "You are not highly skilled at everything" as a character flaw. Of course companies are going to be stronger at certain skills and weaker at others. Because the "traditional" gamer market has been gradually evolving for 30 years, virtually every major 3rd party in existance built their empires by honing just this set of skills.
I think your analysis is on the mark when applied to certain third parties. As I understand your argument, developers are paid to do what they do because they express certain talents (like football stars are paid to play football because they have talents and skills that are useful in competing in professional football games). Game development, being a collaborative endeavor, makes the analogy fit better if we describe a given development
studio as comparable to an entire football
team, but otherwise your conclusions appear sound. Take a stellar development studio belonging to a small company: Valve, for instance (the studio and the company are nearly identical). They are clearly specialized at making first-person viewpoint games, chiefly shooters. They excel at it. Asking them to adapt to making games of another type with restrictions they aren't typically confined to may not be expected to work. Exactly as you say, forcing Valve to make a point-and-click adventure or a Bejewelled puzzler would be as sensible as forcing the Indianapolis Colts to play cricket.
However.
This logic cannot extend to the larger corporate third-party production houses: EA, Activision, Ubisoft, or Capcom. These are not game design studios. They are instead bands of men and women with very large quantities of investors' money at their disposal whose job it is to purchase pools of talent for the purpose of delivering gaming products to sell on the market. The pools of talent are studios, like Valve, who will each individually specialize in particular things. Take Electronic Arts. They make Madden and other sports games. However, it is not sensible to say that Electronic Arts, as a whole,
specializes in sports games. They clearly are capable of making many other things, and they do. EA has
studios that make nothing but sports games, and it would clearly be madness to ask the Madden teams to make The Sims or shooters or port Monopoly to the iPhone. Nevertheless, EA does accomplish all of these things by having multiple pools of talent each with specific capabilities: the Sims team, the FPS teams, the mobile gaming teams, and so forth.
When presented with a new design challenge a small studio like Valve has certain decisions to make, chiefly: can we make a new game of Type X without fundamentally altering our capabilities to make the games we're already successful at: Type A, Type B, Type C, and so forth? If the change is small or otherwise compatible with their current talent pool they may say "yes". Thus Valve made Portal, a non-shooter puzzle game with parkour elements. It's different from anything they made before, however it also shared obvious similarities with their other products: first-person perspective, similar controls, strong atmosphere with innovative storytelling methods, physics-based challenges, and so forth. It was a stretch for their capabilities but they were able to cope without radically altering the team's design sensibility. If presented with a completely different project- say, a 2D fighter- I would expect Valve would reject the project out of hand because the effort and time spent on developing the necessary tools and skills for building that kind of game is too burdensome compared to doing things with their existing skillset.
But when an Electronic Arts is presented with a new design challenge such as a new type of game they don't currently produce they have other options. They can re-purpose existing teams to the new game type, and they have the monetary resources to accomplish the necessary retooling and retraining. This may be a good idea for "pools of talent" whose specialties are no longer profitable- retraining the flight sim guys to make FPS, for instance. Or they can make new hires out of school and allow them to tackle a new design challenge, essentially building a new talent pool from scratch. Or they can follow the most obvious route and buy pre-packaged talent: buy smaller design studios.
All of these take some measure of investment but they obviously pay off. When the Guitar Hero phenomenon went nuclear with the gigantic sales of GH2, Electronic Arts and Activision didn't hesitate to make substantial investments to become competitive in the emerging market. EA partnered with MTV Games who had recently acquired the talent pool called Harmonix. Activision took the more direct route and purchased RedOctane and the Guitar Hero brand. I doubt anyone would suggest this was a bad move on the part of either corporation.
So now turning to the Wii: Where is the problem? I cannot accept that the difficulty is in finding pools of talent who can make compelling games for the system. These large corporations have solved many previous problems of emerging systems or genres through the judicious application of cash: besides the plastic instrument genre, obvious examples are in the bloom of games following big successes in the suspense horror genre, the console shooter genres (single and multiplayer), the GTA-style open world genre, the 2D and 3D fighter genres, the 2D and 3D platforming genres, and so forth. Are we truly willing to claim that breaking into the Wii- not even in specific genres, just in building a hit of any type- is more difficult than any of those accomplishments? The theory is outrageous.
I contend that the problem is not with the Wii but with the industry overall as it exists today. The big corporate publishers have become risk-adverse AND simultaneously risk blind. They do not want to invest money into a new venture unless the chance of success is high by their comprehension of the problem, and unless the amount of money to be invested is small. This results in self-fulfilling expectations of failure as they commit much smaller budgets to conquering portions of the vast Wii market compared to the vast resources they commit to cutting out a slice of the pie on the other consoles... despite the customers on the Wii side being under-served, the competition on the HD side fiercer, and the Wii pie being larger (worldwide) overall.
Nearly all the third-party wounds in their battle for the Wii are self-inflicted. They could have found success with reasonable investment either in new design teams or retooling old teams, giving them adequate budgets, and supporting them with first-rate marketing. Their failure to do that is nothing other than a disorder of corporate strategy.