Less rage more douche because that doesn't accurately describe the situation at all.
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What Really Happened Aboard Air France 447
- Thread starter planar1280
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Less rage more douche because that doesn't accurately describe the situation at all.
Nora Kisaragi
Banned
Lesson learned: If you are an idiot, you can kill hundreds of people.
If you don't know what's happening to the plane, you should back off and let the others handle it, seriously. It seems to me like this plane could have recovered had the idiot not pulled the stick AGAIN at the very last second. Additionally, the crew should have noticed that the idiot had his hands on the stick, and the crew should have realized the plane was in a stall.
Yes, i'm going to call him an idiot because that's what he was/no longer is. Hundreds of people were aboard that plane, and hundreds of lives were in the crew's hands, all lost because of one single Bonin. If you can't use common sense, don't drive a plane, the lesson is as simple as that really.
IndieJones
Member
I apologize. Could you explain how no one even acknowledged that the plane literally shouted "STALL" at them 75 times. I am not even trying to be a douche here.
Actually, never mind I guess, you will just call me a douche again, for the third time.
You could read the article or even the post I made a page ago with the excerpt about why they dismissed the stall warning because people like you who can't read the op.
Edit: nice stealth edit
IndieJones
Member
I read not only the OP but the article twice! Argh, okay, I know that the Airbus is technically "not supposed to stall", unless there is a loss of something like air speed instrumentation. So they might have thought that the machine saying "stall" was just an error itself.
I'm seriously wondering - and I'm sure I'm not alone - how a pilot and a co-pilot (one of whom has been pulling back on the stick the entire time) haven't clued into the fact that the plane could be stalling while the stall warning is blaring for almost two minutes.
I'm seriously baffled, and so are the people who put together the article. I am not disputing anything you've said.
planar1280
Banned
Just to make sure everyone realises this happened in the span of 15 minutes but the first 10 minutes were some initial panicking, the real Pilot error started in the last 5 minutes
I think the issue is, is that they know they are stalling, but since the Airbus averages dual inputs on the sticks, Robert's pushing forward on the stick is counteracted by Bonin's pulling back. Robert probably wasn't even aware of this (he may have learned it during training, but I'm sure he wasn't thinking "Oh yeah, I only get an auditory warning when dual inputs are being applied - I better tell Bonin to take his fucking hands off the stick").
Problem with this is that it doesn't explain why Robert initially pulled back on the stick when he assumed control (a clear error) or why Bonin put his hands back on the stick
Why did he let Bonin take back the controls?
EDIT: sorry, what I meant by "know the plane is stalling" is that they are obviously hearing the "Stall!" alarm, but they're not reacting to it properly. Why did Bonin and then Roberts (although he later pushes forward on the stick) react by pulling back on the stick? Bonin pulls back on the stick multiple times during these final minutes. Poor training? Panic? Bonin thinks he's in a TOGA situation (he says it out loud), but that's the wrong approach to flying at altitude.
samus i am
Member
That was incredibly morbid. I feel depressed.
aronnov reborn
Banned
this just helps me in my belief in not flying anymore.... i know crashes happen so less often as vehicle but you sure have a better chance of survival in the car wreck...
Uh there is no warning when both sticks are being used and bonin can't take it back just like Robert can't take ot away, they're asynchronous they both have control.
As for your edit they say in the article about reverting back to what's familiar trying to go off the planes responses (even though the airbus gives none) etc
Dreams-Visions
Member
^ thy did not follow established control protocols either.
<100 knots + inability to gain altitude despite the nose pointing up (at a rate of 10,000 feet/minute) = "hey guys, maybe we really are in a stall...?"
Why nobody "got it" until the Captain arrived...ugh.
Indeed. The instruments were working. Instruments that would have showed them an airspeed of <100 knots.
<100 knots + inability to gain altitude despite the nose pointing up (at a rate of 10,000 feet/minute) = "hey guys, maybe we really are in a stall...?"
Why nobody "got it" until the Captain arrived...ugh.
planar1280
Banned
most likely Airbus put that system in because the 330 is a fly by wire aircraft which does everything for you except for Takeoff and a bit of landing. In the case of emergency it is standard operating procedure that the captain takes control but in this case but were co-pilots and it would have been very hard for one of the pilots to get up in the situation and let the captain sit in such turbulence and g-force.
IndieJones
Member
I'll say. I've never been in a situation that required even one one-hundredth of the problem-solving skills and cool-headedness needed there, as you can probably tell.
Dreams-Visions
Member
Nope. That's why it's called "egregious pilot error". Because they clearly did some things wrong here that led to tragedy. Established protocols were not followed and one party appeared partially incompetent with regard to Airbus' particulars.
We are discussing pilot error an how it came to be despite all the training they all should have had to keep this situation from happening. No more, no less.
Of course we are - I think we're just trying to understand why Bonin made the initial error, why Robert didn't react properly (at least at first) to the stall and also pulled back on the stick, why Bonin was allowed to resume control of the aircraft (and pulled back on the stick again) after Robert took it back from him, why Airbus thought it was a good idea to only have a visual/auditory warning of dual inputs. This was human error, compounded by questionable design choices, which then resulted in additional human error. How do we avoid this in the future?
In any case, a very good and troubling article. It certainly makes me very reluctant to fly on Airbuses, as I really do find the lack of a physical indication of some sort that dual inputs are being applied to the sticks to be an amazing design error.
Justin Timberlake
Member
God damnit Bonin.
God damnit.
God damnit.
planar1280
Banned
Pilots of A-330 training are trained in the dual input scenario. They are trained to use the CRM training to make sure the pilot in COMMAND at the moment gets the input. In fact they are not trained once for the Aircraft, Pilot training occurs every 2 years for their respective aircraft for more than 40 hours of emergency situations
Hari Seldon
Member
I'd say 75% of the blame is on Bonin, but at least 25% of the blame is on the Airbus design.
- It sounds like the pilots ignored the stall warning because they have heard it before and developed a condition to ignore it. So that "normal" mode bullshit needs to be clearer in the UI of the cockpit. It sounds like they didn't trust any of the instruments because they didn't think it was possible to actually stall the plane. If they had known it switched to a different computing mode and it was possible they might have believed the warning.
- The connected fly by wire controls provided no feedback to the pilots to know that the other pilot was trying to control the plane. Sounds like a case of over-engineering. The 70+ year old mechanical design would have solved the problem immediately.
- The article doesn't mention it, but were there any simple backup analog indicators? Like one of these:
- It sounds like the pilots ignored the stall warning because they have heard it before and developed a condition to ignore it. So that "normal" mode bullshit needs to be clearer in the UI of the cockpit. It sounds like they didn't trust any of the instruments because they didn't think it was possible to actually stall the plane. If they had known it switched to a different computing mode and it was possible they might have believed the warning.
- The connected fly by wire controls provided no feedback to the pilots to know that the other pilot was trying to control the plane. Sounds like a case of over-engineering. The 70+ year old mechanical design would have solved the problem immediately.
- The article doesn't mention it, but were there any simple backup analog indicators? Like one of these:
The stall warning shut off once the airspeed decreased drastically as the computer considers the incoming data invalid under those conditions. So pulling up caused the alarm to stop while nosing down caused the airspeed to increase and the computer to again consider the data valid, which restarted the stall alarm. From the perspective of an inexperienced and/or over stressed pilot, pulling up caused the alarm to subside and therefore appeared to be the correct course of action. The proper maneuver caused the alarms to come back on.
planar1280
Banned
Which is why I think they Reached whats called in Aviation term as Coffins Corner or scientifically Q-Corner at which point if you slow down you are in trouble and if you speed up you are in trouble
TheNatural
My Member!
Wow that's really, really fucked up. How can complete incompetence happen with a trained pilot? He literally held the stick back the entire time until everyone was dead. Amazing how no one went to get the Captain or the Captain did not take over either.
I'm pretty sure that's just your armchair internet piloting getting the best of you. Something like that would be mentioned, and, as the articles state, they were unable to even attain their normal desired altitude due to the unusually high temperature.
Holy shit. I hope fucking Airbus cop a ton of shit for these fucking poor poor design choices.
Sure, Bonin fucked up but I'm sure most of us here would agree some of these design choices by Airbus are just mystifying.
You know in the past I've seen many people in real life tell me such things as Airbus sucking ass when I told em what plane I'd be flying on. Of course the topic of how they are less safe than Boeing also comes up, but I always took it as being just BS. But, reading about some of these design choices really unsettles me.
Sure, Bonin fucked up but I'm sure most of us here would agree some of these design choices by Airbus are just mystifying.
You know in the past I've seen many people in real life tell me such things as Airbus sucking ass when I told em what plane I'd be flying on. Of course the topic of how they are less safe than Boeing also comes up, but I always took it as being just BS. But, reading about some of these design choices really unsettles me.
The alarm shut off around 60 knots or so, so I'm not sure that was the issue at the time. Something else very strange about the airbus design, however, is the auto thrust which protects against the scenario you're talking about(and which shut off when the pitot tubes became blocked) doesn't physically move the throttle lever to correspond with the levels it's setting. So the pilots are not used to considering the lever position and when the auto thrust turned off, it became very important.
Your odds of being in a car wreck are nearly 100% at some point in your life.
Your odds of being in a commercial airline crash are lower than winning a typical state lottery.
I'll take flying.
Dreams-Visions
Member
exactly. even the most "inexperienced" man should have had many hours of training and simulation experience. plenty enough to not have made these kinds of errors.
I'd say 75% of the blame is on Bonin, but at least 25% of the blame is on the Airbus design.
- It sounds like the pilots ignored the stall warning because they have heard it before and developed a condition to ignore it. So that "normal" mode bullshit needs to be clearer in the UI of the cockpit. It sounds like they didn't trust any of the instruments because they didn't think it was possible to actually stall the plane. If they had known it switched to a different computing mode and it was possible they might have believed the warning.
- The connected fly by wire controls provided no feedback to the pilots to know that the other pilot was trying to control the plane. Sounds like a case of over-engineering. The 70+ year old mechanical design would have solved the problem immediately.
- The article doesn't mention it, but were there any simple backup analog indicators? Like one of these:
over-engineering, yes. but I can't imagine they had heard the Stall warning before and found that they could simply ignore it. I can only think that they tuned it out while in the middle of having a brain and communication breakdown (2 things that their year(s) of training is supposed to address and minimize the risk of). Unless they were suddenly deaf, it's the only reasonable explanation to them not hearing it, looking at their properly working avionics and not employing all their training to critically think and come to the right conclusion.
as for your last question, all the on-board instruments were working during the descent, so they should have been aware that the nose was angled up and falling. which makes it all the more baffling to me. but I'll read the article again. maybe I missed a point where the necessary equipment wasn't functioning after reaching max altitude. From what I remember reading, when they got to max height, the instruments were all working properly and Bonin kept trying to climb anyway.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xfh9-ogUgSQ
Actual CVR from Japan Airlines Flight 123. Don't click if you can't stand it.
Mammoth Jones
Member
But isn't that partially because most people drive WAY more than they fly?
What would be the stats if I flew as much as I drove? Or drove as much as I flew?
Mattdaddy
Gold Member
Damn that's a tough one. Sounded like they had their shit together too, there was just nothing to be done. Frickin sad.
I've always wanted to find out what happened about this after all these years, and even though they found the black box some time ago, I still forgot about this incident till now.
I knew it had to be human error considering the technology today and the fact that it was a complete mystery about it. Really eerie that the head captain who must have had the faith in two people to fly the plane left to take a nap at the worst time. Real shame.
I knew it had to be human error considering the technology today and the fact that it was a complete mystery about it. Really eerie that the head captain who must have had the faith in two people to fly the plane left to take a nap at the worst time. Real shame.
Damn......that was horrifying.
Reading about it, they ran a simulator replicating the same mechanical failures and none of the 4 crews who flew the sim could keep the airplane in the air as long as that crew did in real life.
Dreams-Visions
Member
ROUGH.
and the subsequent Discovery video makes it all the more tragic. The plane had been in an accident before and 2 panels in the tail were improperly repaired, eventually leading to the blow-out and loss of the tail.
There was no way that story was going to end happily.
edit: imagine being a passenger for those 30 minutes.
TheJollyCorner
Member
holy shit.....................
Dreams-Visions
Member
it gets worse.
Delayed rescue operation
United States Air Force controllers at Yokota Air Force base situated near the flight path of Flight 123 had been monitoring the distressed aircraft's calls for help. They maintained contact throughout the ordeal with Japanese flight control officials and made their landing strip available to the airplane. After losing track on radar, a U.S. Air Force C-130 from the 345 TAS was asked to search for the missing plane. The C-130 crew was the first to spot the crash site 20 minutes after impact, while it was still daylight. The crew radioed Yokota Air Base to alert them and directed a USAF Huey helicopter from Yokota to the crash site. Rescue teams were assembled in preparation to lower Marines down for rescues by helicopter tow line. The offers by American forces of help to guide Japanese forces immediately to the crash site and of rescue assistance were rejected by Japanese officials. Instead, Japanese government representatives ordered the U.S. crew to keep away from the crash site and return to Yokota Air Base, stating the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) were going to handle the entire rescue alone.
Although a JSDF helicopter eventually spotted the wreck during the night, poor visibility and the difficult mountainous terrain prevented it from landing at the site. The pilot of the JSDF helicopter reported from the air that there were no signs of survivors. Based on this report, JSDF ground personnel did not set out to the actual site the night of the crash. Instead, they were dispatched to spend the night at a makeshift village erecting tents, constructing helicopter landing ramps and in other preparations, all some 63 kilometers from the wreck. JSDF did not set out for the actual crash site until the following morning. Medical staff later found a number of passengers' bodies whose injuries indicated that they had survived the crash only to die from shock or exposure overnight in the mountains while awaiting rescue.[6] One doctor said "If the discovery had come ten hours earlier, we could have found more survivors." [14]
Yumi Ochiai, one of the four survivors out of 524 passengers and crew, recounted from her hospital bed that she recalled bright lights and the sound of helicopter rotors shortly after she awoke amid the wreckage, and while she could hear screaming and moaning from other survivors, these sounds gradually died away during the night.[6]
-wikiAlthough a JSDF helicopter eventually spotted the wreck during the night, poor visibility and the difficult mountainous terrain prevented it from landing at the site. The pilot of the JSDF helicopter reported from the air that there were no signs of survivors. Based on this report, JSDF ground personnel did not set out to the actual site the night of the crash. Instead, they were dispatched to spend the night at a makeshift village erecting tents, constructing helicopter landing ramps and in other preparations, all some 63 kilometers from the wreck. JSDF did not set out for the actual crash site until the following morning. Medical staff later found a number of passengers' bodies whose injuries indicated that they had survived the crash only to die from shock or exposure overnight in the mountains while awaiting rescue.[6] One doctor said "If the discovery had come ten hours earlier, we could have found more survivors." [14]
Yumi Ochiai, one of the four survivors out of 524 passengers and crew, recounted from her hospital bed that she recalled bright lights and the sound of helicopter rotors shortly after she awoke amid the wreckage, and while she could hear screaming and moaning from other survivors, these sounds gradually died away during the night.[6]
I'm fucking sleighed. Tears, man. Both at knowing those pilots are heroes who's efforts resulted in lives being saved, and that some of those efforts were wasted by government bureaucracy.
I think what really confused them is that the Stall alarm shut off, not in response to what they were doing (putting the nose up), but because the flight computer noted that they were flying under 70 mph (at one point) and turned itself off (by design). They made the wrong assumption (stall alarm is turning off because I'm pulling back on the stick) and it killed them. They should never have made that assumption given that the plane was in the air, but I understand why they did. The whole chain of events started with Bonin's error, but it was compounded by some really weird design decisions, I think. If the plane is in the air and not actually in the process of landing, the stall alarm should never go off (assuming that the plane is going slow enough to trigger the alarm), regardless of what law the flight computer is operating under.
Also, very interesting comments from a Boeing engineer re the physical feedback that Boeing controls give you in a jet:
I really do think Airbus made a poor design decision.
Dreams-Visions
Member
^ yea, I'm going to have to agree with that. why take the feel away? Hell, even if you only simulate the resistance and throttle increase/decrease, it's better than being completely unaware.
that's WILD. what would be the point of that "feature"?
Anyway, with or without the stall warning sounding...with all the other instruments working properly, they should have been aware of their airspeed, no? It just...I'd like to think that with or without the stall warning, there would be enough signs for experienced pilots to apply inductive reasoning. If a pilot is experiencing a rapid loss of altitude despite a nose pointed up and max power, why would one not want to double-check speed to make sure you're not in a stall-like situation? Just to be sure? I realize that everything went down in only a few minutes, but it seems like it would be a basic instinctual thing for pilots with enough experience to be deemed worthy of sitting in the cockpit to check.
Maybe they didn't believe what the instruments were telling them because of the issues they were having with the computers earlier?
that's WILD. what would be the point of that "feature"?
Anyway, with or without the stall warning sounding...with all the other instruments working properly, they should have been aware of their airspeed, no? It just...I'd like to think that with or without the stall warning, there would be enough signs for experienced pilots to apply inductive reasoning. If a pilot is experiencing a rapid loss of altitude despite a nose pointed up and max power, why would one not want to double-check speed to make sure you're not in a stall-like situation? Just to be sure? I realize that everything went down in only a few minutes, but it seems like it would be a basic instinctual thing for pilots with enough experience to be deemed worthy of sitting in the cockpit to check.
Maybe they didn't believe what the instruments were telling them because of the issues they were having with the computers earlier?
Shao Kahn Brewing a Stew
Banned
Good God. That was heartbreaking to read...
I would guess the feature is intended to reflect the fact that a commercial airliner never expects to be moving that slowly, and it may not trust its inputs if they indicate such a low speed.
Does anyone know if there is any situation in which a stall alarm would turn off by pulling up? It seems to me that the only way to counteract a stall would be to turn the nose down, but I know absolutely nothing about aviation.
Dreams-Visions
Member
If speed is low enough for a stall alarm to engage in the first place, it's because there is not enough airspeed to support lift, so no...if airspeed is low enough for a stall warning, turning the nose up makes attaining critical speed even more unlikely. Unless the plane has a set of rocket boosters it can fire off.
Correct.
OpinionatedCyborg
Member
Pretty intense. Bravo to the crew maintaining composure and keeping the plane flying as long as they did.
outlawedprod
Member
I believe some of the people involved in the bad repairs to the plane which lead to the tail coming off committed suicide.
DiscoJer
Member
Of course, your chances of surviving a car wreck are much, much higher.
And except in cases where you drive off the road and get trapped and no one finds you, it's over quickly. In airplane crashes you usually have several minutes of sheer terror before dying.
I was on an airliner that had a major problem. I won't say it nearly crashed, but basically the left engine (it was a 2 engine plane) seized up shortly after takeoff (and I had the window seat right over it) which was not a lot of fun to go through. Granted 2 engine planes can fly with only one engine, but it also damaged part of the wing (the fan blades looked like they flew out)
As a person who flies 130,000 miles a year, I've been pretty lucky with my flights. Worst flight ever was this tiny Fokker that flew from London City Airport to Rotterdam during a storm - it was the most terrifying flight I've ever been on.
But the Air France crash was the last straw for me re: Air France. I was having so many problems with them that I decided to cut up my Flying Blue card and switched to Star Alliance. No regrets with that decision whatsoever.
But the Air France crash was the last straw for me re: Air France. I was having so many problems with them that I decided to cut up my Flying Blue card and switched to Star Alliance. No regrets with that decision whatsoever.
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