As of 2009-2010, the Foreign Office had more staff in New Delhi than in Washington which seems to reflect a growing trend in the West of focus on Asia. Here are some key quotes from a
report released that year.
Sir David Manning
The truth is we can go and talk to the Administration about any issue that we want to, if it matters to us and we want to discuss it with the Administration or on the Hill,we have access. We are very fortunate, and I think it is the case that we probably have as good access as anybody, and probably better than most. Access doesn’t necessarily mean that what you ask for you are going to get, of course, and I think we need to be realistic about that. This is an unequal relationship in the sense that the United States is a global power. We are not; and one of the things that I think we have to be conscious of is that, on a lot of these issues, there’s not much we can do by ourselves.
Sir Jeremy Greenstock
The United States would want something in the Security Council, but the United States tends to walk around with quite heavy boots, and there are sensitive flowers in the United Nations [...]. The UK is a lot better at the tactical handling of other delegations and of language in drafting texts and tactical manoeuvring....When we agree with the United States, we can be very helpful to it in that kind of subterranean tactical handling, which doesn’t come out in public. The Americans appreciate that, because it brings them something they don’t normally have. We of course gain from being on the coat tails of the immense power operation of the United States, which brings us into places that we wouldn’t reach if we were just on our own and we wouldn’t reach, frankly, if we were just with the European Union.
Nick Witney commented that, for politicians, “there isn’t a better photo-op than in the Rose Garden or the White House”, while Stryker McGuire argued that for British prime ministers who are “encountering rough seas at home”, the ‘special relationship’ can be a “comfort blanket” providing “safe harbour” and offering “ego-boosting” properties. A recurrent theme in much of the evidence we received was that the UK’s approach to the US could more appropriately be characterised as subservient rather than simply subordinate. The accusation is not new. On a number of occasions since the end of theCold War, Britain has been accused of failing to define its own agenda, and of passively following the US lead. During our current inquiry, the issue of the UK’s alleged undue deference towards the US achieved particular prominence in connection with the continuing debate over Tony Blair’s relationship with George W. Bush and the 2003 Iraq War.
Note: When Tony Blair was giving evidence in the Iraq enquiry, he stated “this is an alliance that we have with the United States of America. It is not a contract; it’s not, ‘You do this and we’ll do that’
Simultaneously, the growth in geopolitical power of the rising economies such as,Brazil, Russia, India and China (the so called BRICs) demanded the US’s attention whilst also challenging US influence in some areas and arguably diminishing the importance of the UK and Europe to America’s wider diplomacy. Professor Clarke commented that the “dangers and opportunities presented by the Asian economies […] and the natural economic asymmetry between American and Chinese economic needs”, suggest that the US would pay considerably more attention to East Asia and the Pacific arenas of economic and trade activity. He noted that China currently held 83% of the US trade deficit in non oil goods, amounting to some $800 billion, while the US was the dominant market forChinese manufacturers - responsible for perhaps 50-60 million Chinese jobs. He continues,“and all this while China’s currency is kept undervalued by anything from 20–30%—a huge protectionist trade barrier operated by Beijing that infuriates Congress. These imbalances will not be righted quickly and suggest a volatile economic relationship that is probably structural”
Some choice quotes further reinforce the stance that the value of this relationship will continue to diminish. What was also interesting, although perhaps not surprising, was that there were members within the US administration who were frustrated with what they felt was the British 'obsession' with the relationship.
