This seems a rather facile analysis that ignores the potentially significant costs of intervention. That Assad is a threat does not warrant our intervention. We must juxtapose the costs of our intervention with the potential benefits, and I find the potential costs prohibitive. First, he is less of a threat today than previously, and even then he was only a peripheral adversary. He is undoubtedly a menace to the people of Syria, and the atrocities he's committed are abominable. But his preoccupation with survival has diminished his ability to threaten American interests. Moreover, the conflagration in Syria is of modest strategic import to the U.S. outside of the consequences for transnational terrorism. If Assad retains power, the region remains in status quo. And although that might be a nominal victory for Iran, the cost of their victory would be considerable. The U.S. can countenance a Pyrrhic victory for the Iranians. Rather than an asset, he's become a burden to Iran. And they have committed a prodigal mistake in dissipating vital assets to merely sustain a crumbling ally. The possibility of removing a weak Iranian ally does not justify our intervention. Regarding normal diplomatic relations, I don't think that's necessarily true; even if it were, normalized relations is perhaps the least compelling reason for intervention. And I am hesitant to begin a crusade to remove illegitimate leaders.
To justify intervention for the dubious prospect of stability, whether in Syria or the broader region, ignores the consequences of another intervention without a concrete design for post-conflict governance. The removal of Assad is not going to magically induce stability. Instead, it will create a vacuum that, if he disappeared at this moment, would be filled by the powerful factions within Syria. That includes rebels who desire a democratic state, but also Islamist factions, many with links to transnational terrorist networks and foreign fighters, and Iran's proxies, notably Hezbollah. I concur that a sustained international effort would be necessary for even a chance at stabilizing Syria. And the UN has administered post-conflict states in the past. But the experiences in Cambodia, East Timor, and Kosovo have made me skeptical of the ability of the international community to successfully stabilize a post-conflict state. Further, who would contribute to the international effort to stabilize Syria? The effort would require civilian administration, law enforcement, and a large multilateral peacekeeping force. Presumably, the U.S., Western Europe, and their allies would contribute the preponderance of forces and materials. But I am unaware of any template that delineates responsibility for post-conflict governance in Syria. Further, the states who would be expected to shoulder the burden have been fatigued from over a decade in Iraq and Afghanistan. Without a plan to administer post-conflict Syria, our intervention would be heedless. The consequences of a power vacuum in post-conflict states are graver than the status quo. Until the West has a plan, and I doubt they'll unveil one soon, our intervention would actively contribute to instability.
Finally, the proposition that we can influence the post-Assad government seems patently Panglossian. Through what mechanism can we influence this hypothetical government? Even prior to our withdrawal from Iraq our influence waned. And that is despite a decade of cooperation and robust material support. The Afghan government is another example of a recalcitrant partner despite our effective subsidization of their entire government. You greatly exaggerate our ability to influence a post-Assad government.
Perhaps there's a humanitarian reason to intervene, although I am skeptical, but I see little evidence that intervention serves our interests.Indeed, it already is a magnet for transnational terrorist networks. But I disagree on the second point. Although Assad provides an attractive villain for terrorist groups, the presence of Western troops and civilian administrators, which would undoubtedly lead the international effort in post-conflict Syria, would provide an even more attractive boogeyman. Whether in Lebanon, Somalia, or Iraq, the presence of Western troops, especially American troops, is a magnet for transnational terrorists. And unless the international community acts with unprecedented celerity, they will fail to assemble an effective coalition in time to obviate the arrival of foreign fighters.
