Really? They come up in public interest litigation, against the federal government, where the alleged "victims" number in the millions? Zero legitimate plaintiffs here, zero. Yeah, one or two might be granted "standing", but anyone who thinks these people were "injured" in any way by the IRS rule is being disingenuous.
Standing is a potential issue
in every case. But for the Court's insistence on reaching the merits,
Roe v. Wade would have been dismissed for mootness. Does that fact imply that Norma McCorvey's case was somehow illegitimate? In litigation challenging the IRS rule at issue in
King, anyone who would not be subjected to a penalty but for the availability of credits on an FFE will be a proper plaintiff, including individuals subject to the individual mandate only because credits are available and employers subject to the employer mandate. One potential problem is that whether someone would be subject to penalties may vary from one tax year to the next (a fact which brings to mind the very capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception to standard mootness doctrine that permitted
Roe to be decided on its merits).
Yeah, it also includes examples of how the IRS rule abides by practically every accepted canon of statutory construction, which the plaintiff's violates. I like it because it exposes this lawsuit for what it is: ideologically driven grammar trolling.
Note that the canons cited by Eskridge come nowhere close to a list of "every accepted canon of statutory construction." The Scalia and Garner book I keep referring to (and to which Eskridge
et al. also refer in their brief) lists some 57 canons, yet even it does not purport to be exhaustive. In any event, the Eskridge brief mentions the following canons (in addition to the whole-text canon, which I'll discuss further, below):
(1)
The presumption against ineffectiveness. This canon advises that a textually permissible interpretation that furthers rather than obstructs the document's purpose should be favored. But I deny that reading "established by the State" to refer to an FFE is a textually permissible interpretation, so this canon cannot rescue it. (This is a recurring problem with all the canon's cited by Eskridge--canons of construction help a court decide which of two or more permissible readings to adopt; they don't permit a court to adopt an
impermissible reading--but I won't repeat it below.)
(2)
The presumption of validity. Eskridge
et al. misuse this canon. While this presumption
does, as the Eskridge brief quotes Scalia and Garner, "disfavor[] interpretations that would nullify the provision or the entire instrument," the types of nullification avoided by this canon are specifically those which render an instrument
legally ineffective, not those that render it
practically ineffective. As Scalia and Garner continue: "for example, an interpretation that would cause a future interest created by a will to violate the rule against perpetuities, that would cause an arbitration clause to be unenforceable, or that would cause a statute to be unconstitutional." This canon does
not, as Eskridge purports, "require[] judges to presume that Congress does not write statutes to fail."
(3)
Congress does not hide elephants in mouseholes. The D.C. Circuit panel in
Halbig addressed this argument well. To expand on that argument, on either reading of 36B, credits are restricted based on the sort of plan (it must be a "qualified health plan"), the market on which the plan is sold (the individual market, not the small group market, for instance), and the method of enrollment ("through an Exchange"). Eskridge attempts to rescue the argument from the
Halbig opinion by pointing to another provision relevant to credits which limits availability to Exchanges (without the "established by the State" language), but the argument fails: 1312(e) limits the class of applicable taxpayers entitled to receive
HHS assistance in applying for credits; it says nothing about the availability of credits themselves. The credits could very well be offered to all "applicable taxpayers," but assistance in applying for such credits given by HHS only for those who enroll through an Exchange, for instance. In any event, Eskridge's retort doesn't address the other two restrictions buried in the same subclauses of 36B as "established by the State."
(4)
Conditions on a grant of federal money must be unambiguous. This is the
Pennhurst argument of which BM is so proud. It suffers from two important weaknesses. First, as I've mentioned before, the Court will only address the question if it first concludes that 36B clearly limits credits to state-established exchanges. So, a condition to raising this argument resolves it. Second, the Court thinks about cases like this as akin to contract formation. Conditions attached to an offer of federal money have to be clear, the Court reasons, because it would be unfair to impose requirements on the states that accept the offer if those requirements weren’t obvious at the time the offer was accepted. But here, the complaining states are those that
rejected the purported offer. These are not offerees bound to a contract that includes a hidden term; they are offerees
not bound to a contract because they rejected it. The
Pennhurst analysis is inapplicable.
(5)
The presumption in favor of cooperative federalism. I haven't actually given this argument much thought (and this is by no means a standard canon--hence Eskridge's citation to a footnote in a plurality opinion), so I'll skip a fuller response to it for now, and simply refer back to the general response I made in (1), above.
And contrary to what you say, the IRS interpretation violates several canons of construction, including the following off the top of my head:
(1)
The omitted-case canon. I've mentioned this canon already. It's the one that holds that a matter not covered is to be treated as not covered. The government's interpretation of the ACA violates this canon not only with respect to 36B, but also with respect to the fifth through tenth appearances of "established by the State" (see below).
(2)
The surplusage canon. If possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect, and none should be ignored. Because, on the IRS reading, "Exchange established by the State under section 1311" means the same thing as "Exchange," this canon is violated.
(3)
The presumption that a material variation in terms suggests a variation in meaning. As I've noted before, 36B switches from referring to the individual market "within a State" to an Exchange established "by the State." If "by" is read to mean "within," which the government maintains it should be, then this canon is violated.
(4)
The interpretive directions canon. This canon instructs courts to carefully follow definition sections. The IRS rule completely ignores the statutory definition of "State."
That one, which happens to be the entire premise of your argument. Address that one without referring to anything outside of the text as the Eskridge brief defended the opposing conclusion.
The phrase "established by the State" appears some 15 times in the text of the ACA (as amended by the HCERA). First, it appears in section 1311(f)(3)(A), which permits a "State . . . to authorize an Exchange established by the State under this section to enter into an agreement with an eligible entity to carry out 1 or more responsibilities of the Exchange." This provision makes sense if "established by the State" means what it says. It doesn't make much sense if it includes a reference to an Exchange established by HHS. Suddenly each state gets authority over what HHS does regarding an FFE in that state?
The second and third appearances are in 36B, and I've already discussed those appearances thoroughly.
The fourth appearance is in section 2001(b)(2) (enacting 42 U.S.C. 1396a(gg)). This is the Medicaid maintenance-of-effort provision, which is relied on by both the challengers and the government. The challengers have the better argument: it makes more sense that Congress would freeze state changes to Medicaid eligibility until
the state established an Exchange than to make such changes contingent on
federal action in establishing an FFE.
The fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth appearances all relate to new requirements for pre-existing federal programs. These provide the government's best context-based argument against the challengers' reading, because the government can argue that Congress
must have meant to include FFEs, or it can argue that it would be unconstitutionally coercive for Congress to threaten a state's CHIP funding (say) if it failed to establish an Exchange under the ACA. That second argument is almost certainly true, but that doesn't mean that the Court should (mis)interpret the provision; it means it should invalidate its plain meaning (perhaps reforming it as the Court did with the Medicaid provision in
NFIB). As for the first, the more straightforward (and less question-begging) reading is to recognize each instance as an example of an omitted matter--these sections just don't address FFEs.
The final five appearances all indisputably refer to states. See sections 2303(a)(2) (enacting 42 U.S.C. 1396a(ii)(1), which refers to an "income eligibility level established by the State that does not exceed the highest income eligibility level established under the State plan under this subchapter"); 2401 (enacting 42 U.S.C. 1396n(k)(3), providing that "
n order for a State plan amendment to be approved under this subsection, the State shall--(A) develop and implement such amendment in collaboration with a Development and Implementation Council established by the State that includes a majority of members with disabilities, elderly individuals, and their representatives and consults and collaborates with such individuals"); 2706(d) (referring separately to "performance guidelines established by the Secretary" under one subsection and an "annual minimal savings level established by the State" under another); 2951 (referring to "quantifiable, measurable benchmarks established by the State" that is an "eligible entity" (a term that typically means a "State")); 6201(a)(4)(B)(iii) (requiring that a "participating State . . . have [certain] procedures in place . . . in accordance with procedures established by the State").
One of the other arguments raised by the government and its amici concerns the definition of "qualified individuals" in section 1312. For two reasons, I think the government's argument on this point is wrong. First, 1312 appears in the same subchapter as 1311, and before the subchapter that begins with 1321. So, it makes sense to read 1312's definition of "qualified individuals" as applicable to an Exchange established by the State under 1311, but not necessarily applicable to an Exchange established by HHS under 1321. What's more, as the D.C. Circuit panel in Halbig pointed out, the text of the ACA does not say that only qualified individuals may purchase qualified health plans on an Exchange. (And if you have a problem with their refusal to change a statute by adding "only" here and there, then you may be a tax protester.) Two subsections of 1312 support this interpretation. The first is 1312(f)(1)(B), which provides that "[a]n individual shall not be treated as a qualified individual if, at the time of enrollment, the individual is incarcerated." The second is 1312(f)(3), which states that "f an individual is not . . . a citizen or national of the United States or an alien lawfully present in the United States, the individual shall not be treated as a qualified individual and may not be covered under a qualified health plan in the individual market that is offered through an Exchange." If it were enough to exclude a person from purchasing insurance through an Exchange that the person were not a "qualified individual," then there would be no need for the bolded language in 1312(f)(3)--it would say no more than 1312(f)(1)(B).
Anything else?
EDIT:
Now that we've hit 100 pages I'm going to go ahead and make a 2015 thread. It's been long overdue
Hear, hear.
Might I suggest "PoliGAF 2015 |OT| FUCK KING, METAPHOREUS! FUCK IT AND FUCK YOU!"?