Nintendo and Sega released their first console with interchangeable software on the same day in Japan.
So they began at the same starting line but the former became the console manufacturer whom sold the highest volume of consoles in history and is still operating in the same business whereas the latter was forced out by the early '00s.
Unlike big corporations as Sony and Microsoft, Nintendo and Sega shared a common attitude to "play/game" although with totally different inclination, with Nintendo having more of a "toy-like" ethos whereas Sega had a "arcade-like" ethos.
Nintendo built its luxury of hugely popular in-house IPs by themselves, over time, just like Atari or Sega could have done.
The key difference is that from early on Nintendo chose to abandon the arcade business to focus entirily on the console business and at the same time when they were starting to achieve critical mass with the console business they started to think how to sustain that fortune on the long run while at the same time being fiscally conservative.
Nintendo's obsession to seize new genre kings stem from the fear that the success achieved with Famicom/NES was temporary unless they landed on software that could drive their business in the future, over multiple generations.
Beside business foresight, the other critical component that allowed Nintendo to build their hypertrophic first-party software line-up was the support of third-parties because before Famicom open up to third-parties (starting from late '84/early '85) Nintendo in-house software developers were forced to release games with such cadency, to sustain the platform momentum, that at most could have 3 months of development time, shortness which isn't conducive to the creation of genre kings.
As for Kalinske he contributed to Sega weakness in the console business as counter-intuitive as it might sound to many americans (lured by the narrative built around him).
SoA was hardly profitable and was loaded with ton of unsold stocks.
Former Sega president Shoichiro Irimajiri explained well what was the issue that arised in the north american market:
"A huge problem came to light at Sega of America. In the American market, it was typically large retailers such as Toys "R" Us and Wal-Mart that stocked game hardware and software. Those kinds of retailers would buy a huge quantity of stock at first. However, if they didn't sell the stock within a certain period, they'd send it all back. We'd have to buy it all back.
SOA's posted profits in 1993, for example, were all washed away because it had to take extraordinary losses on returned stock later on. Those extraordinary losses came to $100 million or $200 million at a time. Furthermore, retailers in America held a lot of power, and they required manufacturers to have a certain amount of inventory on hand to replenish stocks when items sold out. For example, retailers required SOA to have at least 500,000 Genesis hardware units on hand to replenish sold stock, or they wouldn't do business with us.
SOA had an excess of inventory that would all be sold at once, bringing in a huge amount of revenue. Then, all that inventory would come back from retailers later on and SOA would take a huge loss. With the Genesis, all of those losses started to appear in 1994, 1995, and 1996. If you added up all the losses, the number would be astronomical.
When we looked at the numbers carefully, even though SOA had a reputation for earning so much money, it turned out they weren't earning much at all. We decided we had to change things, and that necessitated reducing the size of the company.
We told Tom Kalinske that we'd give him one year to restructure the company like so. This was a quite a strong request.
After one year, in 1996, the restructuring hadn't progressed at all. We decided we had no choice, and I was ordered to go to SOA and take over as president. Tom Kalinske was asked to step down. I initiated the restructuring and worked to make the company healthy."
Former Sega president Shoichiro Irimajiri recently gave a lecture series at the Forum – Management for Tomorrow. The fifth lecture in the series, held on October 20, 2022, focused on Irimajiri’s time at Sega in the 1990s. Irimajiri joined Sega in an executive role in 1993, right at the...
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If people don't believe his words, don't.
A SoA financial document for fiscal year '97 was leaked online not long ago and it show huge quantity of unsold products related to Genesis/Sega CD/32X/Game Gear that SoA had accumulated over time, for which there was nigh to no demand!
GEN unsold inventory:
HW: 135K
SW: 1402K
Sega CD unsold inventory:
HW: 100K
HW: 118K
32X unsold inventory:
HW: 402K
SW: 623K
GG unsold inventory:
HW: 304K
SW: 941K
Pico unsold inventory:
HW: 131K
SW: 180K
Sega of America had in total over 1 million of unsellable game systems and a few millions of unsellable games in the warehouse related to their old gen.
It's staggering how badly run Sega of America was.
It always makes me smile remembering how SoA spent $10 million to open
Sega Multimedia Studio only to obtain in return a couple of crappy games.
Kalinske was a marketer full of hot air.