https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2016/12/01/2180647/the-taxi-unicorns-new-clothes/
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2016...standing-ubers-bleak-operating-economics.html
Ever thought Uber's prices were too good to be true? Well they were.
Silicon Valley elites justify the subsidies in the name of monopolistic growth expectations and the building of eco-systems*. They believe if monopoly status is achieved, profitability will follow naturally from that point.
Yet, as FT Alphaville has long maintained, there is no reason to assume Uber's obliteration of local competition across the planet will create a sustainable business in the long term. Costs are costs, even if you're a monopoly. As long as people have cheaper alternatives (public transport, legs), they will defect if the break-even price is higher than their inconvenience tolerance threshold.
The fact Silicon Valley thinks otherwise is sadly symptomatic of the emperor's new clothes groupthink dominating the sector. Though it does explain the sector's obsession with popularising the idea that public transport can be done away with. (Less investment in public transport will lead to fewer competitively priced alternatives, empowering the Uber monopoly in the long run).
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2016...standing-ubers-bleak-operating-economics.html
If rapid growth could not drive major margin improvements between 2012 and 2016, there is no reason to believe that Uber will suddenly find billions in scale economies going forward. Fundamentally digital companies like Amazon, EBay, Google and Facebook had massive operating scale economies because the marginal cost of expanded operations was close to zero. Aggressive pricing fueled the growth that drove major margin improvements and also created major consumer welfare benefits.
By contrast, in the hundred years since the first motorized taxi, there has been no evidence of significant scale economies in the urban car service industry. That explains why successful operators never expanded to other cities and why there was no natural tendency towards concentration in individual markets. Drivers, vehicles and fuel account for 85% of urban car service costs. None of these costs decline significantly as companies grow. As the P&L data above demonstrates, Uber has not discovered a magical new way to drive down unit costs.
Uber's refusal to consider an IPO may best be explained by the recognition that publishing detailed, audited financial data confirming these massive losses and the complete lack of progress towards profitability could undermine public confidence about its inevitable march to industry dominance.
There have been hundreds of articles claiming that Uber has produced wonderful benefits, but none of these benefits increase consumer welfare because they depended on billions in subsidies. Uber is currently a staggeringly unprofitable company. Aside from the imposition of unilateral cuts in driver compensation, there is no evidence of any progress towards breakeven, and no one can provide a credible explanation of how Uber could achieve the billions in P&L improvements needed to achieve sustainable profits and investor returns.
Uber's growth to date is entirely explained by its willingness to engage in predatory competition funded by Silicon Valley billionaires pursuing industry dominance. But this financial evidence, while highly suggestive, cannot completely answer the question of how an Uber-dominated industry would impact overall economic welfare.
Ever thought Uber's prices were too good to be true? Well they were.