The luxury tax hit on Lin's $14.9 million salary in 2014-15 was going to be enormous; depending on your assumptions, it was likely to end up close to $30 million, bringing the total cost of employing Lin that season to $45 million. You could argue that Stoudemire or Anthony's contract is costing just as much, so it's not fair to say that Lin's deal is the one pushing them over. But given the money they've already sunk, an economist would rightly describe the $45 million figure in 2014-15 as the marginal cost of matching the Lin deal.
The Knicks, as our Larry Coon pointed out, could have reduced that bill to an extent by using the stretch provision on Lin, but that's almost as bad -- it's perhaps $25 million instead of $45 million, depending on which years the Knicks are in the tax, but you're paying Lin not to play and still need to spend more money (and tax) on somebody to play point guard.
Matching Fields and Lin would have produced an even more obscene wage bill that year; the Knicks' starting backcourt would have cost around $75 million in salary and tax, which is more than nearly every team's payroll in the NBA right now.
But again, the Knicks operated like this wasn't a problem. The tax on Lin's deal might be much easier to handle if they weren't also paying a combined $7.2 million in guaranteed money to Camby, Kidd and Felton that season, even though the first two will be in their 40s and the third might be 300 pounds by then. That's half of Lin's 2014-15 salary and nearly two-thirds of his tax hit right there, on players who likely will give the Knicks little or nothing that season.
That's not all: In the preceding two years, Camby, Felton, and Kidd will make $21 million to Lin's $10 million, and the Knicks are in the tax both seasons. Do the math and you'll see that the Knicks will pay just as much to Camby, Felton and Kidd over the next three seasons as they would have paid for Lin, even allowing for the two minimum salary players that would replace Camby and one of the guards.
