To get answers to some of my questions, I filed half a dozen Freedom of Information Act requests with the US Agency for International Development, the State Department, the Marines, and the Army between May and July 2005.
I asked USAID for documents on reconstruction in Babil. Eight months and more than a dozen follow-up phone calls later, I have received nothing. Nothing except a December 2005 letter, which reads:
"This is in response to your several inquiries regarding the status of your request and specifically your request of today. We are encountering delays in the processing of your request. Processing has been delayed because of a severe backlog due to our inundation of Iraq requests."
Perhaps some of folks who work on USAID's glossy up-with-people "Iraq Reconstruction Weekly Report" - "the Iraq Investment Promotion Agency opened for business last week," trumpets the current issue - should be reassigned to the FOIA division.
I am especially interested in probing USAID because of a curious and upsetting visit I had with one its officers and two Marines in the summer of 2004. The USAID rep had just returned to the State Department's regional headquarters in the city of Hilla after a few weeks of leave. She had a problem, she told her visitors (and me). The budget for the temporary employment program she funded in Babil had swelled inexplicably from $200,000 to $400,000 during her absence, possibly because higher-ups had decided to up funding without speaking to her.
She couldn't investigate whether the program was actually working because USAID and State Department staffers were prohibited from traveling to the area. It was too dangerous. The officer didn't trust the Iraqi subcontractor hired to run the program to tell her truth. So she asked the overtaxed Marines to take a peek at her project. Major Tom West, a Marine civil affairs officer, couldn't promise her anything. West, an earnest USMC reservist and real-life Beverly Hills, CA, cop, was the Corp's pointman for civil-affairs work in Babil. He had more than a plateful of his own initiatives.
So the USAID officer said something startling: She told us she might simply cancel the project. Or, she ventured, she might just let it run, corrupt or not. The Marines offered no opinion, but West, not the most stunnable guy, looked as shocked as I felt. If the project is actually putting food on Iraqi tables, I thought, then her summary decision could starve people. But if the program is lining a Babil fat cat's pockets and she lets it continue, American taxpayers will get screwed - and Iraqis will become even more cynical about the US occupation. Weeks later, I asked her via email what she had done. She wouldn't tell me. I couldn't get an answer from a Washington, DC-based USAID public affairs officer, either.
The State Department is just as bad. I FOIAed State in June 2005 for documents about their International Police Liaison Program, State's great push to train Iraqi cops to take over security from the US. Earlier in 2005 at the Marine base in Babil, I asked one of State's cop trainers how many of his number were assigned to the province. Five, the gentleman told me. FIVE American cops to rebuild Iraqi police forces in a swath of the country with 950,000 people, and with more than a dozen separate police forces. The absurdity of this blew me away. Five? That's not even a token effort; it's a joke. (The current police-training flavor-of-the-month is the US Army's program to embed Military Transition Teams with Iraqi police forces, a policy settled on after news broke that rogue Shi'a police units were allegedly acting as death squads.) More than nine months after FOIAing documents on the liaison program and a dozen-plus follow-up calls, I have received nothing from State. The FOIA department is horribly backlogged and in disarray, I am told.
It's tragic: the very information that might help Americans determine whether Bush Administration promises are being kept is either being withheld or, if I accept USAID's explanation, is stuck in the clogged FOIA pipeline.
I have, however, had little FOIA successes. US Third Army (Central Command) sent me a copy of a video briefing US troops receive after entering the Iraq theater. Helpful tips contained therein: "Do not stare at the women," "shake hands firmly," and "punctuality is not necessarily their priority."
Third Army/Central Command denied my request for a copy of the Rules of Engagement under which US forces operate. Of course, I already had both the ROE and the rules for the use of force, which are printed on green and white cards, respectively. Newly arrived troops get them as soon as they deplane in Kuwait. As if the "insurgents", who study US forces every day, don't know from experience exactly what the ROE are. Most "insurgents" probably have hard copies, anyway: I found a pair of the cards in a mud puddle on the Marine base in Babil, a base that was open to Iraqis with proper ID when I was there.
Second Marine Division supplied me with a handful of preliminary investigation reports into civilian casualties at the hands of Marines during the BLT's 2004-05 deployment. There are two constants in the reports: no disciplinary or judicial action is recommended against Marines who mistakenly injure or kill civilians, and no Iraqi testimony is included. Some of these shoots may have been "righteous," as the grunts would phrase it - justified or understandable. But some might not be. We'll never know, and we'll probably never hear the Iraqi side of the story.
The Corps also turned over heavily redacted paperwork I requested on five Marines killed in action during that tour. Only one of five documents contains information I hadn't already read in public sources or learned from my own reporting. "Purple heart is recommended," each report concludes. The Marine Corps denied my request for more detailed documents covering the circumstances of their deaths because, in the USMC's words, releasing such reports "could result in an affront to the sensitivities of surviving next of kin." This information is therefore exempt under FOIA, the letter states.