To enable the reader to evaluate pure textualism with an open mind, we must lay to rest at the outset the slander that it is a device calculated to produce socially or politically conservative outcomes. Textualism is not well designed to achieve ideological ends, relying as it does on the most objective criterion available: the accepted contextual meaning that the words had when the law was enacted. A textualist reading will sometimes produce "conservative" outcomes, sometimes "liberal" ones. If any interpretive method deserves to be labeled an ideological "device," it is not textualism but competing methodologies such as purposivism and consequentialism, by which the words and implications of text are replaced with abstractly conceived "purposes" or interpreter-desired "consequences." Willful judges might use textualism to achieve the ends they desire, and when the various indications of textual meaning point in different directions, even dutiful judges may unconsciously give undue weight to the factors that lead to what they consider the best result. But in a textualist culture, the distortion of the willful judge is much more transparent, and the dutiful judge is never invited to pursue the purposes and consequences that he prefers.
If pure textualism were actually a technique for achieving ideological ends, your authors would be counted extraordinarily inept at it. One of them, a confessed law-and-order social conservative, wrote the first
Supreme Court opinion protesting the "enhancement" (i.e., increase) of criminal sentences on the basis of factual determinations made by judge rather than jury and dissented from such "conservative" majority opinions as those setting a constitutional limit on the amount of
punitive damages, preventing tort suits against
nonmilitary personnel by persons injured in active military service, and imposing criminal punishment for "
using a firearm" on a defendant whose "use" of the gun was to trade it for drugs. He has cast the deciding vote or written for the Court in such "liberal" majority opinions as the one holding unconstitutional laws prohibiting the
burning of the American flag and the one overruling the case allowing
un-cross-examined hearsay to be introduced in criminal prosecutions. Your other author holds many opinions commonly seen as "liberal." He is pro-choice, for example, and supports same-sex marriage; but he finds nothing in the text of the Constitution that mandates these policies. He also favors gun control and deplores the Second Amendment, but he believes that the majority opinion in
Heller correctly interpreted that amendment as establishing a person right to bear firearms.