In Iran, power is built on clan‑family networks rather than formal institutions. The Larijani family is among the top three in terms of control over key state structures (the judiciary, security, and the nuclear program). After Ali Larijani's death, the clan's influence will weaken, but his brothers (above all Sadeq) will retain part of their positions. However, it is important to understand that in recent years Ali Larijani himself has held a literally key position in Iran's power system and was not a purely technical figure who could easily be replaced (as Aragchi claims).
Apart from the Larijanis, there are several other top clan‑family networks. First and foremost is, of course, the Khamenei family, which maintains control over the office of the Rahbar, the security services, and a significant part of the IRGC. Members of the clan occupy key positions in intelligence, the economy, and propaganda.
Next in influence is the Hashemi‑Rafsanjani family. After the death of former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, its influence declined, but it is preserved through his children and sons‑in‑law, and the Rafsanjani clan is the undisputed leader of the systemic opposition and reformist circles.
The Khatami family clan—its influence has also weakened. The clan competed with the Rafsanjani family for influence within the reformist wing of the elite and remains an influential player on this flank, enjoying strong support from the urban middle class.
The Motahhari clan is a classic "revolutionary aristocracy," with strong ties to the Larijani clan and, in fact, together with it exerts influence through the clergy, parliament, and ideology.
The Golpayegani family holds a key post—the leadership of the Rahbar's office together with the Khamenei family—controlling huge financial flows, intelligence, and personnel appointments across all structures. This is a shadow elite comparable in influence to the Larijani family.
One can also mention the Velayati and Qadr/Arafi families. The choice of Arafi as interim Rahbar was due to the strong influence of these families in Qom and their unique position linking the clergy, the security apparatus, and the secular authorities.
Fans of the series "Game of Thrones" will find much in common (though, of course, direct analogies would be inaccurate) between the power system of Westeros and that of contemporary Iran. The Larijani clan occupies roughly the position of the Lannister clan in Martin's universe.
In other words, Larijani's death may not bring about obvious, immediate critical problems for the stability of power in Iran, but the loss looks almost irreplaceable—there is simply no one right now who can take his place. In 2025–2026, Ali Larijani was not just "one of the influential figures"; in the course of the current war he effectively became the central figure in running the country after Khamenei's death. Many Western and Iranian sources called him the "de facto leader," "the one who really rules," the coordinator of the war, nuclear policy, repression, and foreign relations. His death is not just the weakening of one clan, but the loss of the strongest remaining centralized player who was holding the system together under conditions of war and a Rahbar vacuum—including now, when the fate and condition of Mojtaba Khamenei are unknown.
With Ali Larijani's death, his clan loses a huge share of its functional powers and influence, which will inevitably give an advantage to more militaristic groupings within the IRGC and to the current leader, Mojtaba (if he ultimately survives and manages to bring the security wing under his control).
The death of leading clan leaders under the conditions of the current war, given the specific organization of power in Iran, is very likely to lead to its fragmentation and split. The system is holding together by inertia, but a much wider window opens for unforeseen shifts—potentially in any direction.