I feel like y'all are sort of beating about the bush. The question is, is the absolute letter all that matters, or does intent factor into it? Intent is a difficult thing to measure, so some would say it should be discounted entirely, but I see that as short-sighted. If we have the opportunity to divine the spirit of the law, we should. Leave excruciating textual analysis for a time that we can't just call up the people who wrote and voted for the law and ask them what how they meant for it to work.
The "spirit of the law" is a conjuration of judges who bristle at the idea of legislative supremacy. Rather than recognizing that the federal government makes law through the processes of bicameralism and presentment, it permits the judge to usurp for him- or herself the legislative task.
The idea of a "spirit of the law" is today antiquated, thankfully. It has been largely displaced by textualism and replaced by purposivism. In other words, some people think laws should be interpreted in accordance with their
purposes, or the subjective intentions of those who enacted them. But this invites judges to climb what Justice Scalia has referred to as the "ladder of ambiguity," whereby the judge defines the purpose of a statute and enters judgment accordingly. So, in
King, is the
purpose of the law to expand health insurance coverage primarily through state action? Or to expand health insurance coverage through whatever means? Or generally to improve the health of the populace? Which statement of purpose a judge chooses may very well dictate the outcome of the case, and there is no objective standard to which he or she may resort (other than the text, naturally).
Additionally, purposivism pretends that a statute (or legislature) has
an intent or
a purpose. But a legislature is composed of many individuals, each of whom may have harbored his or her own understanding and intention in voting for the law--which may have been no understanding at all. A statute is the product of many minds working together, often working at cross-purposes and with different understandings of the meaning of the language used. For all we know, the only purpose or intention shared by every legislator who voted for a bill is that that bill, as voted on, become law.
But, you ask, why not just go ask the legislators who enacted the statute what their intent was? This commits the error a number of others have committed, choosing to ignore the statute enacted by Congress in favor of polling
post hoc, self-serving justifications. If we want to know what the statute means, we can read it. That's why it's written. We are not bound by unenacted subjective intentions, purposes, or understandings. Laws do not become enacted through the silent assent of legislators; they become enacted through the processes outlined in the Constitution (i.e., bicameralism and presentment). The statute, once enacted, is binding law, and nothing else is.
You haven't really demonstrated any reason why you should be respected. Do I need to go into arguments about whether or not the Earth is 6000 years old with that mentality in mind?
Right, they could have said any of those things, but instead they said that the federal exchange would stand in for the state one, as "such exchange," which means exactly the same thing.
Regarding your first sentence, I will no longer respond to your posts concerning
King (which may not strike you as a loss, but which I do consider regrettable in light of your most recent post on that topic, wherein you finally--
finally--offer a substantive argument). You've shown yourself incapable of having an adult conversation on this subject.
But, before I go, regarding your second, the phrase "such exchange" cannot bear the weight you want it to carry. "Such," in context, refers back to the Exchange described earlier in section 1321--i.e., an Exchange that meets the requirements of HHS regulations. But 36B doesn't say that credits are available for insurance purchased through an Exchange that meets the requirements of 1321 and associated regulations; it says they are available for insurance purchased through an Exchange "established by the State." "Such" does not change who established the Exchange, which is what matters under 36B.
I also think intent can be impossible to gauge, when presented with situations that were probably never thought of when creating the law or court precedent, and we might as well just admit that personal ideology is the only thing that matters at that point.
I don't care if you're liberal, conservative, or claim to be an "original textualist", your argument when intent is unclear is always going to be decided by the outcome you want to see.
Not so. The textualist, when confronted with a silent text, will not impose his or her views on that silence. He or she will recognize that the statute does not answer the question before the court. Here's Justice Scalia's approach, as explained in the book,
Reading Law, which he co-wrote with Bryan Garner:
Scalia & Garner said:
The principle that a matter not covered is not covered is so obvious that it seems absurd to recite it. The judge should not presume that every statute answers every question, the answers to be discovered through interpretation. . . .
Yet some authorities assert the judicial power, even the judicial responsibility, to supply words or even whole provisions that have been omitted. Some of them would have the court "reconstruct what the enacting legislature would have wanted" if it had addressed the overlooked case.
. . .
The traditional view, and the one we support, is to the contrary. The absent provision cannot be supplied by the courrts. What the legislature "would have wanted" it did not provide, and that is an end of the matter.
. . .
The search for what the legislature "would have wanted" is invariably either a deception or a delusion. What is a gap anyway? . . . t is the space between what the statute provides and what the gap-finding judge thinks it should have provided. . . . What has been omitted in the gap invariably turns out to be what the judge believes desirable--so gap-filling ultimately comes down to the assertion of an inherent judicial power to write the law. . . . Judicial amendment flatly contradicts democratic self-governance.