If people focus on advertising, they're misconceiving Romney's mistake. Obama's lead in early voting derives not from advertisements, but his organizational advantage. According to the latest data, the Obama campaign has three times as many field offices in Iowa as the Romney campaign. Democrats have not been motivated because of advertisements. Rather, it's the Obama campaign's concerted effort to register and assist voters. People should question the Romney campaign's failure to develop field offices and their organization.
Yes. Let's. I've not had a good foreign policy post in a while.
The ICG recently updated its evaluation of Afghanistan. And, in what should be surprising to few, the prospects are dismal. They enumerate many of the problems I've noted throughout the past few years.
First, as in Iraq, the surge failed; this is Obama's greatest mistake. It not only failed to induce an enduring political solution, violence remains disconcertingly high. We weakened a few of the insurgent groups, yet many remain dangerous. And they will recover once more ISAF forces withdraw. Second, despite our substantial investment, the ANSF remains ill-equipped to administer security. But the security forces are not the cardinal problem. Compared to the governance problem, the inadequate security forces are a mole hill. Rather, the government remains plagued by factionalism, corruption, and incompetence. Without a nominally functional government, Afghanistan will fail. Perhaps not immediately, especially because other states are interested in maintaining a semblance of order, but the problem could decimate the state; if it even persists as a coherent state. At least the notion of reconciliation, which was always chimerical, seems to have been abandoned.
They offer a few prescriptions to address the problems. But the solutions are nearly trivial. The problems are insuperable and, as we should have realized by now, beyond our capabilities. At least the Obama Administration has adhered to its withdrawal timeline.
:lol PhoenixDark
