Everyone knows there's no guarantees of a deal and an exit is possible if the Troika makes no acceptable deal.
I'm not sure how that relates to my post, as obviously if there is no deal there is no default.
But to clarify, what I was saying is that one can't draw a conclusive inference (as some are) as to whether the people who voted "No" are actually willing to exit the Euro if it means they will no longer have to accept conditions set by the creditor nations.
What people were told their vote meant, what people are interpreting the outcome to mean, what the realistic and plausible scenarios of the referendum are, do not all align.
As an example, people were told that capital controls would be lifted today, presumably regardless of the outcome of the vote. The realistic scenario in the event of a "No" as has unfolded is that the provision of ELA would remain unchanged or tightened, meaning an extension of capital controls and an increased likelihood of bank insolvency.
As another example, people were told this would strengthen the bargaining hand and/or accelerate a deal being made. It has in fact made an agreement less likely, from my understanding, and any agreement made will actually need to be more severe given the impact of the last week or so's events. The imposition of capital controls brought about by the second bailout lapsing in itself has apparently dramatically increased the necessary size of a third bailout.
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Also as it's somewhat related, since it has been mentioned a lot and is apparently part of Greece's new bargaining position in their talks, regarding the recent IMF report on debt sustainability and the need for some form of relief (whether outright or through a more like maturity extension),
The Economist wrote an article last week, they argue the current position is a result of the past six months of turmoil, wherein any gains made have evaporated.
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2015/07/imfs-sad-story
They suggest that Greece's debt position would have been projected to fall to 117% GDP in 2020 and 104% GDP in 2022, given the more favorable economic signs at the end of 2014, rather than the now projected 150% GDP in 2020.
At a brief look at the summary of the DSA report, it seems a correct interpretation. So it actually seems kind of strange the Tsipras government has seized on this report as vindication, as while it does say that some form of relief is now necessary, it also attributes this need to recent policy changes and reiterates the need for a return to stalled policy implementation. I'm not sure if anyone has read the full text and could provide some further context.