Sorry to be responding a few days late, fellows. Brawndo Addict, I'll begin with your last response to me, since it is so confused (and confusing).
The common parlance of saying "at least" is that of a minimum that can go up in size. As in, you at least agree that OPOV should apply in this kind of situation if not more. Perhaps you meant to say something like "at most" or "insofar as it applies to". But if that was the intention, then a parenthetical was a mistake as the limitation was central to your idea and not an addendum or clarification (as a clarification should change comprehension not meaning). You either meant to speak generally or specifically, you can't have both. I will assume you meant OPOV applies only in a specific scenario.
You correctly note that the term "at least" denotes "a minimum that can go up in size." (I'd quibble over your word choice here, but I see no benefit in arguing over
how you said something when I can clearly understand what it is that you've said. This rule not only saves space but also preserves me from looking like a total dickbag--er, that's "scrotum" in common parlance. Oh, and does this parenthetical follow your style guide?) From there you proceed immediately to forget the definition you just enunciated--presumably because you realized
that's how I used the term--and point to other things I "perhaps . . . meant." Nope. I meant the first thing. (In case (or, if you're still in the mood for choose-your-own-inappropriate-replacement-phrase, at least/insofar as it applies to/at most--and what does your style guide say about parentheses-within-parentheses, btw?) you're still confused, the "minimum" was "elections to governmental bodies with members apportioned by population" and the "can go up in size" (style-guide thoughts on using that phrase as a noun?) would be, by process of elimination, "other elections.")
Inexplicably assuming that I must have meant "at most" or "insofar as it applies to," you next accuse me of mistakenly segregating the phrase that correctly began with "at least" from the rest of the sentence by means of parentheses. Given that you conditioned the validity of this accusation on the truth of your inexplicable assumption, I see no need to address it further, since the condition failed.
Your concluding assumption wasn't an assumption. You simply read what I said and comprehended it. Congratulations, I guess. (Well, kind of. My use of "at least" conflicts with your use of "only," and you've completely ignored the beginning of the sentence, where I said "I . . . thought . . . we c[ould] all agree that...." (ending a quotation with ellipses isn't going to earn me another lecture on punctuation and its Brawndo-Addict-approved uses, is it?))
Yes, you're limiting it such that your conclusion is the only possible outcome. You're creating the illusion of choice and then acting shocked that people don't accept the setup.
I don't understand your complaint here. Well, I
do, but what I understand you to mean can't possibly support a complaint, so I can't accept that I'm right about it. It seems to me that you're complaining that my conclusion necessarily follows and is true. It's as if I said, "If X, then Y," and you said, "Of course Y if X! But Q if P! Illusion of choice!" (And I'm not sure where this "illusion of choice" garbage is coming from. I left ample room for people to disagree with my conclusion. Black Mamba, for instance, rejects the idea that each vote should carry the same electoral power. But, in any event, that a conclusion necessarily follows from given premises is not a valid basis for criticism.)
Is OPOV supposed to apply before or after the apportionment method is chosen? If before then why do we eschew it in regards to the Senate? Any answer to that presupposes the existence of superior or countervailing ideals. If after, then OPOV can only kick in because of the particular method we have chosen. So there has to be something about apportionment by population that makes the mantra "one person, one vote" applicable in that scenario and not outweighed by alternative ideals or principles.
This complaint ignores the context in which this challenge was brought. The plaintiffs in this case are not arguing that requiring states to equalize voting populations is a nice idea or in furtherance of some foundational principle unembodied in law. They're arguing that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution mandates such equalization. So there's no reason to ask, "BUT WHAT ABOUT TEH SENATE?!!1! CHECKMATE REPULBICANS!" because under no interpretation of the Constitution could one legitimately argue that the Senate must be apportioned by population rather than by the two-senators-per-state rule.
Your final sentence merely restates the question raised by this case: is "One Person, One Vote"
the constitutional principle when it comes to divvying up population into districts, or is it only
a principle that exists in tension with, and can be overcome by, other principles (such as representational equality)?
As to the rest, we should simply look at the text.
Article 1 Section 2 Clause 3:
Overridden by the 14th Amendment Section 2:
I don't see how any honest textual or historical inquiry could say that there is latent ambiguity regarding whether person means an eligible voter. I can see the argument for ambiguity regarding citizenship and persons.
I don't see anyone--honest or otherwise--suggesting "that there is latent ambiguity regarding whether person means an eligible voter." "Person" is clearly broader than "voter" or "citizen," and no, there is no ambiguity between "citizen" and "person," either. So, we might either view this as another pre-existing structural exception to the OPOV rule, or we might recognize that
apportioning representatives among the states is a separate process from
establishing districts within states; and, in any event, we might argue (as the
Evenwel plaintiffs do) that the duty to equalize voter populations exists at least (most/insofar/Toledo/whatever) when states can equalize both total populations
and voter populations among districts.
In short, the text of the Constitution doesn't answer this question.
But as you said: "The issue is not the different ways we can decide to apportion, it's whether the "One Person, One Vote" maxim is being upheld." If different governments and different populations changes the applicability of the maxim, then so too would differing definitions of population impact its applicability, for they too would result in different governments and different populations.
I'm rethinking my earlier congratulations. For starters, I never said what you quote me as saying ("The issue is not the different ways" etc.). Second, the "different governments" and "different populations" I referred to are
actual "different governments" and
actual "different populations." The population subject to government by the City of Dallas at any given time is completely different the population subject to government by the City of Muleshoe at that time, and the governments of those cities are also completely different. However, those living in Dallas are no more nor less subject to the authority of the Texas Legislature than are those living in Muleshoe. In this regard, it is
the same government and
the same population.
Now I don't even understand.
With all the effort you've put into
not understanding, I can't say this outcome surprises me. You accused me of begging the question by appending "population" parenthetically to the stated principle. I didn't beg the question, but to accommodate your confusion I offered to remove it. You complain now that the principle doesn't apply across the board (a point that had been addressed by the parenthetical I generously removed). Fine. It doesn't.
But, and this is the heart of this controversy,
when it does apply, does it mean that voter populations must be equalized among districts? Every other topic you've raised--the Senate, municipalities, the phrase "at least," the proper usage of parentheticals, and all the rest--are red herrings.
If both can be achieved, why can't both be enforced? Why would one be constitutionally mandated while the other isn't?
If the Court is to enforce both, then the plaintiffs win.
I don't agree because this is an impossibility. There is always by some measure that one vote will "carry more weight" than another person's. It's unavoidable.
But the plaintiffs can't prove this in Texas because they don't have the stats to back up the claim. At least not reliably. That's my issue.
I'd like to state I'm not theoretically against the "eligible voter method," only the notion that the SCOTUS can tell states they cannot use total population even if there is a discrepancy, here.
This is just a question of evidence, though. Either a plaintiff can produce reliable and persuasive evidence to make his case that the OPOV rule has been violated, or he can't. If the former, he wins; if the latter, he loses. But, unless it is
literally impossible to reliably calculate the number of eligible voters in a locale--which I highly doubt--then there's no reason to decide whether OPOV is the governing rule based on evidentiary issues. That'd be like saying, "Gosh, it's really hard to prove that a person was fired because of her sex. You know what, it's no longer illegal to discriminate based on sex in employment decisions!"