The development of inelastic supply in some of our most successful metropolitan areas is a relatively recent phenomenon. As late as the 1960s, building was lightly regulated almost everywhere. Much housing was built in all high demand areas, including coastal California and New York City. However, there has been a great transformation since the 1970s, in which property rights have essentially been reassigned from existing land owners to wider communities, which have chosen to substantially reduce the amount of new building. This change reflected the growing power of anti-growth political movements and environmentalism more generally. These groups include historic preservationists in New York City, conservationists in California, and a myriad of local and state actors concerned about the costs of new development.
The fundamental nature of building is that it creates significant concentrated benefits for the land owner who is developing and widespread small harm to almost everyone else from the inconvenience of construction and downward pressure on housing values from increased supply. In a system where democracy is limited by lobbying and corruption, the interests of developers can dominate. Conversely, if decisions are made by majority vote, development projects face a considerable disadvantage, especially since many of the potential beneficiaries of a new project may not live in the jurisdiction when the project is debated. If this view is correct, then the great transformation is unlikely to be reversed unless there are means for compensating existing residents for the downsides of development.