The most complete version of the integrated society can be found in a science fiction story in which it is the year 2200 and everybody is a creamy shade of beige. Race has not merely become irrelevant but has disappeared altogether under the guiding hand of genetic entropy. A second and slightly less extreme version of the utopia posits a society in which racial identification is still possible, but no longer relevant to anyone’s thinking or generalizations about anyone else. In this world of racial irrelevance, the sensory data employed in making a racial identification, though still available, would have returned to the domain of other similar human identification data in such a way as to obliterate the cultural concept of race. Race would have become functionally equivalent to eye color in contemporary society. In yet a third version of the integrated society, racial identification persists as a cultural unifying force for each group, equivalent to idealized models of religious tolerance. Each group respects the diverse character of every other group, and there are no patterns of domination or oppression between different groups.
Each of these visions of the future reflects the achievement of a casteless, if not classless, society in which there is no hierarchy of status corresponding with racial identification. The essential defect in the color-blind theory of racial discrimination is that it presupposes the attainment of one of these futures. It is a doctrine that both declares racial characteristics irrelevant and prevents any affirmative steps to achieve the condition of racial irrelevance.
These theories are not alone in presupposing the goal that one is purportedly working toward. Suppose one were to visit the future society of racial irrelevance and discover conditions that in any other society might be regarded as corresponding with a pattern of racial discrimination. Among such conditions might be that one race seems to have a hugely disproportionate share of the worst houses, most demeaning jobs, and least control over societal resources. For such conditions to be fair and accepted as legitimate by the disfavored race in future society, they would have to be perceived as produced by accidental, impartial, or neutral phenomena utterly dissociated from any racist practice. Otherwise the future society would fail to meet its claim of racial irrelevance and would not be a future society at all.
Any theory of antidiscrimination law which legitimizes as nondiscriminatory substantial disproportionate burdens borne by one race is effectively claiming that its distributional rules are already the ones that would exist in future society. From the perspective of a victim in present society, where plenty of explicit racist practices prevail, the predictable and legitimate demand is that those ostensibly neutral rules demonstrate themselves to be the ones that would in fact exist in future society. The legitimacy of the demand is underscored by the fact that those very rules appealed to by the beneficiaries to legitimize the conditions of the victims were created by and are maintained by the dominate race. From the perpetrator perspective however, those practices not conceded to be racist are held constant, they are presumed consistent with the ethics of future society, and the victims are asked to prove that such is not the case. This is a core difference between the victim and perpetrator perspectives.
A vision of the future also bears on the question of who will benefit from the attainment of the integrated society. To introduce the issue more precisely, one might ask whether the integrated society is an end in of itself or just a symbolic measure of the actual liberation of an oppressed racial group from the conditions of oppression. To say that the integrated society is an end in itself, apart from the interests of the oppressed group in its own liberation, is basically to say that the goal is in the interest of society at large or in the interest of the dominate group as well as of the oppressed one. It is hardly controversial to contend that integration is for everyone’s benefit, or even that it is in some sense for the benefit of the dominant group. Problems arise however, when interests diverge and the dominant’s group desire for integration supersedes the victim group’s demand for relief