Rather than being based purely on personalities, these changes are most often traced to the messagesboth emboldening and unsettlingthat the Chinese leadership took from the world financial collapse of 2008.
The messages were that maybe Chinas moment had finally arrived. The financial crisis had started in America, after five years of a disastrous Middle Eastern warand just as the China of the Beijing Olympics was seeming shiny and unstoppable in every way. I was living in Beijing at the time and couldnt miss the tone in state media and from government officials that the rise and decline of empires was happening faster than anyone had foreseen. The crisis made the leadership much more confident and assertive abroadbut also more worried and nervous about what might happen to their own economy at home, a foreign academic, who didnt want to be named, told me. And the combination of being arrogant abroad and paranoid at home is about the least desirable combination of all, from the rest of the worlds perspective.
The paradoxical combination of insecurity and aggressiveness is hardly confined to China. The United States has all too many examples in its own politics. But this paradox on a national-strategic scale for China matched what many people told me about Xi himself as a leader: The more uncertain he feels about Chinas diplomatic and economic position in the world, and the more grumbling he hears about his ongoing crackdown, the more decisively he is likely to act. Xi is a weak man who wants to look strong, a foreign businessman who has worked in China for many years told me. He is the son of a famous father [Xi Zhongxun, who fought alongside Mao as a guerrilla and became an important Communist leader] and wants to prove he is worthy of the name. As weve seen in other cultures, this can be a dangerous mix. Ten years ago, when I visited a defense-oriented think tank in Beijing, I was startled to see a gigantic wall map showing U.S.-affiliated encampments and weapons on every Chinese frontier except the one bordering Russia. I came to understand that the graphic prominence of the U.S. military reflected a fairly widespread suspicion that the United States wishes China ill, is threatened by its rise, and does not want to see China succeed. Almost no one I spoke with recently, however, foresaw a realistic danger of a shooting war between China and the United States or any of its alliesincluding the frequently discussed scenario of an unintentional naval or aerial encounter in the South China Sea. Through the past few years, in fact, U.S. military officials, led by the Navy, have engaged their Peoples Liberation Army counterparts in meetings, conferences, and exercises, precisely to lessen the risk of war by miscalculation. Naval forces are actually pretty good at de-escalating and steering out of one anothers way, a senior U.S. Navy officer told me.